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Day after day, judges make decisions. Given the amount of time judgesdevote to decision making, it’s logical for an organization devoted tohelping judges do a better job—and its flagship journal—to focus on
the subject. And we are.
Last year, the American Judges Association obtained a grant from the State
Justice Institute so that we could hire a researcher to help us look at this issue.
Pamela Casey, a researcher with the National Center for State Courts, worked
with AJA judges throughout 2012, jointly exploring the science of decision
making, how what’s known about that science is likely to have the greatest
impact on judges, and how judges might take this information into account in
their daily work. The result was the third white paper produced by the Ameri-
can Judges Association since 2007—a paper presented at the AJA’s annual edu-
cational conference in New Orleans in October
2012. That paper is the lead article for this spe-
cial issue on judicial decision making.
Our second article comes from Vanderbilt
law professor Terry Maroney, who has done a
great deal of work over the past two years con-
sidering how judges deal with their emotions.
As Maroney explains, judges must expect to
have emotional reactions to the cases and peo-
ple they encounter while doing their job. She
looks at the strategies judges might try to reg-
ulate their emotional responses, suggesting
that some won’t help much and some probably
will be harmful—and that even when it is nec-
essary, behavioral suppression (like a judge hiding emotional responses) comes
at a cost to the judge. Maroney concludes with some practical suggestions.
Our third article comes from two Israeli social scientists, Eyal Peer and Eyal
Gamliel, who consider one specific aspect of judicial decision making—the use
of heuristics. As they describe them, heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, or rules
of thumb, by which people make decisions without having to consider all the
variables, relying on only a limited set of cues to make a decision. Peer and
Gamliel consider how judges use heuristics, along with common situations in
which the use of heuristics may lead to errors. They also provide an overview
of ways in which judges might counter such errors.
Given the importance of judicial decision making, this will be the first of
two Court Review issues on the topic. In our next issue, we’ll have an article
examining how well judges can make decisions about who’s telling the truth in
a trial. We’ll also have an article looking at how judges use experts in making
decisions. And we’ll have articles describing several specific experiments
involving judicial decision making, along with articles about the problems in
evaluating judicial performance given the difficulty of evaluating decision
making.  
We hope you find the discussion of value. We’d also note that Professor
Maroney will be speaking at our educational conference in September, and
there will be a session based on the AJA decision-making white paper as well.
We hope to see you there. —Steve Leben & Alan Tomkins
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
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President’s Column
Toni M. Higginbotham
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION 2013 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
Kohala Coast, Hawaii
The Fairmont Orchid
September 22-27
$219 single/double
I invite you to join the AmericanJudges Association
as we gather for our
2013 Annual Educa-
tional Conference. The con-
ference will be held September
22–27 at the luxurious Fairmont Orchid on
“The Big Island” of Hawaii. Every year I look
forward to the AJA conference, and this year is
no exception. Not only do I get a chance to
attend fascinating educational sessions on a
variety of topics of interest to me as a judge, but
also to see friends I have made over the years
and to make new ones. The contacts I have made
through AJA have provided me with an invalu-
able network across the United States and
Canada — I can send an e-mail or pick up the
phone and get ideas on how to address many of
the problems we all face on the bench. Please
take a few minutes to read the conference
brochure (http://goo.gl/SklRK), and then regis-
ter as soon as possible for this great conference.
Toni M. Higginbotham, President
This paper was developed with support from the State Justice Institute
(under grant number SJI-12-N-005) and the National Center for State
Courts. The points of view expressed are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the State
Justice Institute or the National Center for State Courts.
The authors thank Jennifer Elek, Ingo Keilitz, and Robert Rust for
their substantial help in developing the scope and content of the
paper; we also thank Kate Lorenz and Alicia Walther for their admin-
istrative and editing assistance.
Scientists carefully study how our brain processes information, though judges rarelyconsider these studies. But this research has great potential significance to judges,who spend much of their time making decisions of great importance to others.
Although the study of how the brain processes information is an evolving one, the infor-
mation now available can help judges to make better decisions.
Much of the processing for simple tasks—called reflexive processing—occurs in the
background, while most of us solve riddles or math problems through reflective process-
ing, which is deliberate and conscious. The reflective system has a limited capacity, so we
operate on a principle of least effort, tending to rely on the reflexive system when possi-
ble. To do so, we often use what scientists call schemas, in which characteristics of objects,
people, or behaviors coalesce into an easily recognizable pattern (like our ability to tell that
a red octagon in the distance is a stop sign).
Heuristics are schemas that are based on only part of the information available—letting
us make decisions more quickly. But heuristics can be faulty in a variety of ways. And since
heuristics (like all schemas) operate in the world of unconscious, reflexive processing, we
can easily make errors without recognizing the source of a faulty decision. Anchoring is one
of these heuristics: for example, a person is likely to give a higher or lower estimate of dam-
ages if a particularly high (or low) figure is introduced early in the process. That number—
even if far off the mark—tends to act as an anchor around which later estimates are formed. 
Implicit biases, another type of schema, also threaten fair processes and just outcomes.
They are based on implicit attitudes or stereotypes that operate below the radar, and judges
have been shown susceptible to them as well.
But most behaviors and decisions result from a combination of both reflexive and reflec-
tive processes, so there are ways to lessen the effects of faulty heuristics and implicit biases.
One step is to understand some of the causes of diminished decision-making abilities,
which include fatigue (like sleep deprivation), other depleted resources (like glucose lev-
els), mood, fluency (i.e., ease of processing information), and multitasking. Fatigue,
diminished resources, and multitasking all diminish performance.  Fluent, easy-to-under-
stand information will seem more accurate than more dense, hard-to-understand informa-
tion, but that isn’t necessarily the case. And mood affects the way we process information,
Pamela Casey, Kevin Burke & Steve Leben
A WHITE PAPER OF THE AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION
MAKING BETTER JUDGES®
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with those in a positive mood generally more likely to engage in reflexive, automatic pro-
cessing and those in a negative mood more likely to engage in more reflective, deliberative
processing.
Several techniques can help judges to be more mindful and aware of the decision-mak-
ing process so that they make better decisions. First, focus on the higher purpose of the pro-
ceeding—hearing and properly deciding a case with a real impact on someone, not just pro-
cessing a court docket. Second, formalize and critique heuristics used to make repetitive but
important decisions. For example, a judge might consider what factors are leading to bail
decisions or probation conditions: Are they based on accurate information? Third, be mind-
ful and periodically “read the dials.” Are you tired? Is noise in the hallway a distraction? Is
a break in order? Taking a break or engaging in even brief meditation can restore awareness
and reduce stress. Fourth, decision aids, like checklists, can help. Doctors and pilots have
shown that even well-trained professionals can improve performance by following check-
lists. Fifth, seek feedback and foster accountability. Judges often operate in isolation and
without feedback. Competitive athletes improve performance through constant coaching
and feedback, and judges can improve performance by getting objective feedback too.
This paper builds upon our 2007 American Judges Association white paper on proce-
dural fairness. Litigant satisfaction is dependent upon judicial adherence to the four com-
ponents of procedural fairness: voice (allowing litigants to be heard), neutrality (making
decisions based on neutral, transparent principles), respectful treatment, and trust (the
perception that the judge is sincere and caring). Focusing on procedural fairness can help
a judge to be more mindful and focused on accurate decision making. For example, a
judge may feel that he or she has heard a similar case before, but the judge focused on pro-
cedural fairness will try to listen carefully to the case now at hand. To show that the judge
has heard what the litigants have said, the judge will repeat key themes from the parties’
testimony or argument. By doing so, the judge has the opportunity to see how this case
may differ from others he or she has heard before. And the mindful judge will be careful
to consider that possibility.
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Footnotes
1. See, e.g., Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of
Judicial Reasoning, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAK-
ING 41 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
2. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient
in Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4 (2007); see Tom R. Tyler, Pro-
cedural Justice and the Court, 44 CT. REV. 26, 30-31 (2007) (pro-
viding the key procedural-justice principles contained in the side-
bar).
3. See Steve Leben, Considering Procedural-Fairness Concepts in the
Courts of Utah, at 4-6, paper presented at the Utah state judicial
conference, Sept. 14, 2011, available at http://www.procedural
fairness.org/Resources/~/media/Microsites/Files/procedural-
fairness/Utah%20Courts%20and%20Procedural%20Fair-
ness%2009-2011.ashx.
4. In a 2007 survey, respondents were asked, “[T]o what extent do
you think a state judge’s ruling is influenced by his or her politi-
cal views—to a great extent, moderate extent, small extent, or not
at all?” Thirty percent said to a great extent, and forty-five percent
said to a moderate extent. The survey had 1,514 respondents and
a reported margin of error of 3%. 2007 Annenberg Public Policy
Center Judicial Survey, available at http://www.annenbergpub
licpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey/Sur-
vey_Questions_10-17-2007.pdf.  
5. In a 2006 survey, respondents were asked “[T]o what extent do
you think a desire to be promoted to the next higher court would
affect a judge’s ability to be fair and impartial when deciding a
case—to a great extent, moderate extent, small extent, or not at
all?” Thirty-five percent of respondents said to a great extent, and
forty percent said to a moderate extent. The survey had 1,002
respondents and a reported margin of error of 3%. Annenberg
Public Policy Center Judicial Independence Survey, available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/NewsFilter.aspx?my
SubType=PressRelease&.  
The fundamental role of judges is to ensure a fair process and a just outcome for eachcase they hear. Although much has been written about how judges go about theirdecision-making process, for most judges that literature is not on their reading list
or a part of their judicial education. Speculation about whether judges use a more induc-
tive, bottom-up approach to review information and arrive at a decision or a more deduc-
tive, top-down approach that starts with a decision and finds the information to support
it has interested many social scientists, but only a few judges.1 The press of heavy case-
loads or shrinking budgets seems far more imperative for judges to focus on. But a sig-
nificant and growing body of research from the fields of cognitive psychology and neuro-
science provides important insights about the decision-making process. How information
is processed can affect fair processes and just outcomes. Judges who aspire to be great—
not just good—at their profession need to focus on how to become better at making good
decisions.
This white paper reviews research about decision making and discusses its implications
for helping judges ensure fair processes and just outcomes. The paper builds on the 2007
American Judges Association (AJA) white paper, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, that encouraged judges to incorporate the principles of procedural
fairness (see sidebar), or procedural justice, to help ensure a decision-making process
deemed fair by litigants.2 Procedural fairness increases compliance with court orders and
is critical to positive public perceptions of the court system.3 But for a variety of reasons,
the legitimacy of judicial decisions is under attack. People believe, for example, that to a
moderate or significant extent, judges make decisions based upon their personal or polit-
ical beliefs rather than the rule of law.4 Nearly the same percentage of people believe
judges make decisions to a moderate or significant extent based on their desire to be
appointed to a higher court.5 The times dictate that judges become even more committed
to procedural fairness, and a better understanding of how to improve the decision-mak-
ing process is imperative to achieving that goal. Moreover, judges must provide both a
process recognized for its fairness and good, fair decisions.
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6. Matthew D. Lieberman, Reflective and Reflexive Judgment Processes:
A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach, in SOCIAL JUDGMENTS:
IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES 44 (Joseph P. Forgas, Kipling D.
Williams, & William Von Hippel eds., 2003). Scientists are still
exploring whether there are, in fact, two different systems, multi-
ple systems, or multiple processes that make up one system, but
most agree on “processes that are unconscious, rapid, automatic,
and high capacity, and those that are conscious, slow, and deliber-
ative.” Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Rea-
soning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 255 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255,
256 (2008). The white paper relies on Lieberman’s model because
of his extensive work mapping areas of the brain in which each
system predominates and because the labels he uses are more
descriptive of decision-making processes than, for example, Daniel
Kahneman’s system 1 and system 2 labels. Compare Burke &
Leben, supra note 2, and Lieberman, supra, with DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
Being a great judge all of the time is not easy. Judges are mortals
with all of the accompanying frailties. Implementing procedural-
justice principles in the courtroom demands the judge’s “mindful”
or conscious focus and attention but also demands good decision-
making practices in general. Understanding how the brain
processes information and the various factors that can influence
decisions and courtroom behaviors is a first step to practicing more
mindful decision making. 
There is a compelling body of knowledge accumulated by social
and cognitive science on information processing and decision mak-
ing. More recently, advances in neuroscience have helped scientists
further expand their understanding of how the brain processes information. Although
this continues to be a robust area of inquiry, there is much that scientists do not yet know.
Thus this white paper is a snapshot in time, offered with the understanding that advances
in technology and neuroscience promise continued refinement of current knowledge and
its implications for the decision-making process. This paper offers a summary of some of
the key findings applicable to judicial decision making and provides references for those
readers interested in learning more. 
At any point in time, an individual is bombarded with a host of sensory informa-tion. Most of this information is processed “behind the scenes” with little or noknowledge on the part of the individual. Much like a computer continues to work
in the background while a word-processing program is on the screen, individuals also
constantly process a barrage of sights (e.g., the glare on the screen), sounds (e.g., the click
of the keys), smells (e.g., the coffee on the desk), and other information—sorting, cate-
gorizing, and storing it—even as the individuals intently focus on a specific task (e.g.,
reading a case file or writing an opinion). 
This dual system of information processing is the mechanism through which judg-
ments and decisions are made. Neuroscientist Matthew Lieberman refers to the auto-
matic, rapid, unconscious system that operates in the background as reflexive, and the
deliberative, slow, and conscious system as reflective. Through neuroimaging, he has
identified different areas of the brain associated with each system.6
The reflexive, automatic system relies on patterns that develop based on the individ-
THE SCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING
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Key Procedural-Justice Principles:
• Voice—Litigants have the opportu-
nity to participate in the process and
offer their perspective. 
• Neutrality—Litigants believe the
judge is neutral, makes decisions
based on rules rather than opinions,
and applies rules consistently.
• Respectful treatment—Litigants
are treated with dignity and feel their
problems are taken seriously.
• Trust—Litigants perceive the judge is
sincere and caring.
Tyler, infra note 2
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ual’s experiences with the world. The individual learns over time
how to distinguish different objects, people, actions, and situations
based on features that coalesce into patterns. These patterns,
referred to as schemas, help the brain process information quickly
and efficiently. Based on prior experiences, for example, individuals
know that a red octagon means stop and an outstretched hand is a
greeting. 
The reflective, controlled system relies on intention and effort to perform a task. Mem-
orizing a new phone number or computer password requires concentration. Once the
phone number is repeatedly practiced, however, it becomes a readily accessible schema
that comes to mind with little effort. For a judge with a domestic-violence docket, for
example, a bit of study up-front would teach the judge the elements of domestic battery—
with no need to look it up again as each case is called.
While the reflexive system can process information on an ongoing basis, the reflective
system has a limited capacity. It works for a while but eventually runs out of gas. Thus
the brain is somewhat miserly about its use of the reflective system. This “principle of
least effort” means that decision makers initially tend to rely on the automatic retrieval of
schemas to process incoming information and engage the reflective system only when
motivated to do otherwise by, for example, learning a new skill or solving a complex
problem.7
Gary Klein refers to this reliance on schemas as recognition-primed decision making.8
Klein’s premise is that experts develop schemas, based on their experience, that they sub-
sequently use to size up a situation and decide how to move forward.
Thus a firefighter does not enter a burning building and proceed to
analyze all the potential options for action. Rather, the firefighter
instantaneously takes in a variety of information about the current
situation and matches it to a response option that has worked in sim-
ilar situations. The initial option (i.e., decision) may not have been
the best option if there had been enough time to generate and analyze all possible options,
but it usually works. In this sense, Klein says his model relies on what Herbert Simon
referred to as “satisficing”—finding the first option that works rather than the most opti-
mal option.9 Judges, particularly when confronted with large dockets, heavy calendars, or
pressing “emergency” motions, can tend to use the same process as the firefighter. Some-
times using the first option that works rather than the optimal option actually might be
okay—but not always.
Schema-based, reflexive decision making works for countless choices an individual
makes throughout the day.10 And in some instances, such as those requiring a quick deci-
7. Serena Chen & Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic-Systematic Model in
Its Broader Context, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 73 (Shelley Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
8. Gary A. Klein, A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid
Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION: MODELS AND
METHODS 138 (Gary A. Klein, Judith Orasanu, Roberta Calder-
wood, & Caroline E. Zsambok eds., 1993).
9. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environ-
ment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1956).
10. “Most of the time we solve problems without coming close to the
conscious, step-by-step analysis of the deliberative approach. In
fact, attempting to approach even a small fraction of the problems
we encounter in a full, deliberative manner would bring our activ-
ities to a screeching halt. Out of necessity, most of problem-solv-
ing is intuitive.” PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM
SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 14 (2010). 
Reflexive processes—Like blinking
in bright sunlight, these reflexive
processes are automatic, rapid, and
unconscious.
Reflective processes—Like solving
a math problem, reflective processes
are deliberative, slow, and conscious.
Schemas—Characteristics of objects,
people, and behaviors that, based on
an individual’s experiences, coalesce
into patterns (e.g., a red octagon
means stop). 
11. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can
Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 331 (1993); Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler,
Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Prefer-
ences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181
(1991).
12. See Desmond Morris, Gestures, Meanings, and Cultures, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fRQSRed
58XM, for some common examples of cultural differences in
interpreting gestures in a video by Desmond Morris.
13. Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Mak-
ing, 62 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 451 (2011).
14. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6.
15. Id.; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
16. Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler, & Fritz Strack, Playing Dice
with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on
Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 188 (2006).
sion in an emergency situation, as in the firefighter example, or a judgment involving an
individual preference, like selecting the best tasting jam, the reflexive approach might be
better than a more deliberative, reflective approach.11 The problem with reflexive deci-
sion making, however, is that sometimes the underlying schemas are based on inaccurate
information (e.g., assuming two events that occur together are related, as in supersti-
tions), are only partially correct (e.g., stereotypes), or are applied incorrectly (e.g., using
a gesture that is misinterpreted in another country).12 Two prominent examples of
schemas that can lead to inaccurate decisions are cognitive heuristics and implicit biases,
described in the next sections.
COGNITIVE HEURISTICS
Heuristics are schemas individuals use to solve problems and make
decisions quickly. They work rapidly by attending to only some of
the information available. A judge relying on only some of the infor-
mation available to make a decision that needs to be made quickly
is not necessarily bad. Research shows that reliance on heuristics in
some circumstances can lead to more accurate decisions and judgments than reliance on
more rational models.13 However, research also shows how heuristics can lead decision
makers to jump to conclusions and make errors in solving problems.14 Surely every expe-
rienced judge has at one point jumped to a conclusion that ultimately proved to be
wrong.
The anchoring heuristic predicts that an individual’s estimates or comparison judg-
ments are influenced by an initial value—even if the value is selected at random and has
no connection to the task at hand. A low initial value elicits estimates lower than a high
initial value. In a classic study demonstrating anchoring, participants watched as a
researcher spun a wheel of fortune, wrote down the number observed, and then estimated
the number of African countries in the United Nations.15 The wheel of fortune was rigged
to stop only on the numbers 10 and 65. The median response of participants who wrote
down 10 was 25 countries; the median response for participants who wrote down 65 was
45 countries. Thus the initial random value anchored participants’ subsequent estimates
of the number of countries. 
How applicable is this research to the courtroom? Do judges who have been specifi-
cally trained to follow procedural rules designed to minimize the influence of irrelevant
information succumb to anchoring in the same way as the study participants estimating
the number of African countries in the United Nations? Birte Englich and her colleagues
explored this question and discovered the answer is yes.16 In a series of studies with Ger-
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quickly and with little effort.
82 Court Review - Volume 49 
man judges, they examined whether a criminal sentencing decision
could be influenced by irrelevant anchors that judges knew to be
irrelevant. In the studies, the irrelevant anchor was presented by (a)
a journalist’s question about the sentence, (b) a prosecutor’s
acknowledged, randomly determined sentencing demand, and (c) a
prosecutor’s sentencing demand obtained by the judge throwing a
pair of loaded dice. In all cases the judges’ decisions were influenced by the anchor. The
judges sentenced more harshly when exposed to the higher rather than lower randomly
determined anchor. A fourth study by the researchers also demonstrated that judges
exposed to a high anchor responded to incriminating evidence faster than exculpatory
evidence (measured by response latencies on a timed categorization test), suggesting that
the anchor primed the judges to look for anchor-consistent information.17 In addition,
the criminal-law judges were more certain about their decisions than those who were not
experts in criminal law, suggesting that “experts may mistakenly see themselves as less
susceptible to biasing influences on their sentencing decisions.”18
Another heuristic is the reliance on small samples as indicative of the larger popula-
tion. A set of ten coin tosses, for example, might yield ten heads in a row and thus not be
representative of the larger population of tosses across many small samples that would
yield an even distribution of heads and tails. Nonetheless, individuals frequently view
small samples as representative and adjust their expectations accordingly. Many individ-
uals fall prey to the gambler’s fallacy, erroneously believing, for example, that “black” is
due after a run of “red” on the roulette wheel.19
Uri Simonsohn and Francesca Gino explored the influence of this heuristic on profes-
sionals who make a set of decisions every day.20 They postulated that professionals would
try to align each daily set of decisions to reflect their overall distribution of decisions. To
test this hypothesis, the researchers reviewed data from over 9,000 MBA interviews and
found that interviewers’ daily subsets of scores tended to reflect their overall distribution
of scores. That is, the interviewers took into consideration their previous scores for the
day in formulating their subsequent scores, and the effect was stronger as the day pro-
gressed. Thus even though four interviewees on a given day may all be highly desirable,
interviewers will be reluctant to score all highly, and the interviewees at the end of the
day will be more likely to be ranked lower. The researchers consider what this might
mean for judicial decisions:
Imagine, for example, a judge who must make dozens of judgments a
day. Given that people underestimate the presence of streaks in random
sequences, the judge may be disproportionately reluctant to evaluate 4, 5,
or 6 people in a row in too similar a fashion, even though that “subset” was
formed post-hoc.21
17. The same was not true for exculpatory information. The
researchers found this consistent with prior research indicating
that negative information tends to be more salient for individuals
in general, and they hypothesized that judges focus on the incrim-
inating information because they are charged with determining
whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
18. Englich et al., supra note 16, at 194.
19. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15.
20. Uri Simonshon & Francesca Gino, Daily Horizons: Evidence of
Narrow Bracketing in Judgment from 10 Years of MBA-Admission
Interviews, PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE (forthcoming).
21. Id. at 10-11 (citing Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, & Amos
Tversky, The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Ran-
dom Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295 (1985)).
Research demonstrates that despite their
experience and knowledge, expert
judges are influenced by randomly
determined anchors.
Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 
infra note 16 at 198
22. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001).
23. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blink-
ing on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
21 (2007).
24. Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?: The Difficulty of Deliber-
ately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005). 
25. Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and
Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5
(1989).
26. About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://www.projectimplicit.net/
about.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
Further evidence that judges are susceptible to heuristics comes from a series of stud-
ies by law professors Chris Guthrie and Jeffrey Rachlinski and Judge Andrew Wistrich.22
They explored judges’ use of five different heuristics: (a) anchoring, (b) framing—the
same information presented differently (e.g., the glass is half full or half empty) affects
interpretation of gains and losses, (c) hindsight—the sense that specific outcomes were
more predictable once the outcomes are known (e.g., “Monday-morning quarterback-
ing”), (d) representativeness—ignoring statistical base-rate information, and (e) egocen-
tricity—overconfidence in one’s abilities. They found that judges’ decisions were influ-
enced by each of the heuristics. For example, in a test in which some judges were told
about a clearly meritless motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in a diversity case
(based on the idea that damages were less than $75,000), judges who were aware that
such a motion had been filed awarded a lesser damage amount (30% less overall) than
judges who didn’t know about the motion to dismiss.23 But they also found that judges
showed less susceptibility to the framing and representativeness heuristics than other
experts and laypersons, and, in a subsequent study, found that hindsight did not affect
judges’ decisions in a specific scenario involving a probable-cause determination.24
The findings of a myriad of scientists are that people—judges assuredly included—are
susceptible to heuristics. But we may be able to overcome them. The ability to overcome
heuristics starts with understanding the concept, understanding yourself, and being
inquisitive enough to frequently ask questions—of yourself.
IMPLICIT BIASES
Implicit biases offer another example of how schemas can threaten fair processes and
just outcomes. Implicit biases are based on implicit attitudes or stereotypes that operate
below the radar. As a result, individuals are not aware that implicit biases may be affect-
ing their behaviors and decisions. Indeed, research shows that even individuals who con-
sciously strive to be fair and objective can nonetheless be influenced by implicit biases.25
Scientists use a variety of methods to measure implicit bias, but the most common is
reaction time. Reaction-time measures are based on the reflexive system’s pairing of two
stimuli that are strongly associated (e.g., elderly and frail) more quickly than two stimuli
that are less strongly associated (e.g., elderly and robust). Project Implicit, begun in 1998
by researchers from Harvard University, the University of Virginia, and the University of
Washington, offers web-based reaction-time tests, referred to as Implicit Association
Tests, in over fifteen areas such as weight, age, race, and religion that anyone can take.26
A review of the results of over 2.5 million Implicit Association Tests taken on various
Project Implicit demonstration sites between 2000 and 2006 revealed the pervasiveness of
implicit preferences for socially privileged groups such as white over black and straight
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over gay.27 Research also shows that implicit biases can influence decisions in a variety of
real-life settings such as employers hiring job applicants, police officers deciding to shoot,
healthcare workers providing medical treatment, and voters making voting choices.28
Are judges influenced by implicit biases—despite their training and conscious efforts
to be fair and objective? Of course one would hope not, but perhaps the safest answer is
to concede there is that potential. Research by Rachlinski, Wistrich, and Guthrie, joined
by Sheri Lynn Johnson, suggests that judges actually may be influenced by implicit bias.29
The researchers found, for example, a strong white preference on the Implicit Association
Test among white judges. In keeping with the general population findings of the Implicit
Association Test, the black judges showed no clear preference overall (44% showed a
white preference but the preference was weaker overall). The researchers also reported
some evidence that implicit bias affected judges’ sentencing decisions, though this find-
ing was less clear. Most importantly for this white paper, the researchers found that
“when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of
implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”30
Scientists generally agree that most behaviors and decisions result from a combina-tion of both reflexive and reflective processes. The question is the extent to and wayin which the two processes work together for any particular decision.31 Several
researchers postulate what psychologist Jonathan Evans refers to as “default-interven-
tionist” models of judgment and decision making.32 These models propose that initial
intuitive or reflexive responses are generated, which are then modified or endorsed by the
reflective system. The reflective system routinely endorses the initial responses, reserving
more deliberative, effortful processing to when the individual is motivated to do so and
working memory and time are sufficient.33
In many arenas, default processing is good enough. But in the courtroom, where indi-
viduals face possible restrictions of liberty and we consider other life-altering issues—
such as family preservation, personal safety, economic security, and adequate housing—
fair processes and just outcomes demand a more deliberate approach. Procedural-fairness
principles that call for giving litigants voice, ensuring neutrality, demonstrating respect
and dignity for the litigant, and presenting a trustworthy character all require an actively
engaged decision maker. 
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Even so, deliberative decision making does not mean that judges always override their
initial intuitive reactions. As with firefighters, judges gain expertise over time that will
become part of their reflexive schemas for judging certain cases and will help them move
through their often unwieldy calendars. The problem is that judges, like everyone else,
also rely on faulty schemas (e.g., anchoring and implicit bias) in some circumstances and
thus need to check their thinking for these schemas as well. Guthrie and his colleagues
call this approach the “intuitive-override” model of judging:
[W]e do not suggest that judges should reject intuition in all cases.
Rather, we suggest that judges should use deliberation as a verification
mechanism especially in those cases where intuition is apt to be unreliable
either because feedback is absent or because judges face cues likely to
induce misleading reliance on heuristics.34
Competitive athletes believe that training, adequate sleep, and proper diet are essential
for good performance. But being a judge is a pretty sedentary job, so it is understandable
that many, if not most judges do not view the requirements of good judicial performance
as a competitive athlete might. Even judges should consider how to prepare for the key
components of their work, just as an athlete would. Purposeful engagement of delibera-
tive processing is the essence of good judging—being more attentive and open to each
individual matter and ensuring that fair processes are guiding its outcome. Being atten-
tive and open, however, is not easy when a judge is facing a long docket, complex hear-
ings, particularly contentious parties, or all of the above. In addition, a number of emo-
tional, physical, cognitive, and social or cultural factors can interfere with a judge’s abil-
ity to be mindful. Examples of some of these follow.
FATIGUE
In their article published in 2000, researchers Yvonne Harrison and James Horne
reviewed studies on the effects of sleep deprivation and identified several areas of con-
cern, including “communication, lack of innovation, inflexibility of thought processes,
inappropriate attention to peripheral concerns or distraction, over-reliance on previous
strategies, unwillingness to try out novel strategies, unreliable memory for when events
occurred, change in mood including loss of empathy with colleagues, and inability to deal
with surprise and the unexpected.”35 Much of the research they reviewed was based on
deprivation of one or more nights’ sleep. 
A subsequent article published in 2003 by researchers from the University of Pennsyl-
vania, the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and the Harvard Medical Center explored
whether reduced hours of sleep each night, rather than no sleep at all, might also affect
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performance.36 They found that individuals whose sleep was reduced to 6 hours or less
across a 14-day period produced problems in cognitive performance equal to individuals
who had experienced up to 2 full nights of sleep deprivation. The researchers also found
that individuals reported being only slightly sleepy at the end of the study, when their per-
formance was worst, suggesting that individuals are unreliable at assessing their lack of
sleep or that they do not experience tiredness despite poor performance. 
Talking about how much sleep a judge gets or suggesting that more sleep leads to bet-
ter judicial decisions may seem trite to some and downright preposterous to others. But
why not ask to what extent sleep deprivation does interfere with real-life decision mak-
ing? Dr. Christopher Landrigan and his colleagues investigated the effects of sleep depri-
vation on medical interns with longer shifts and discovered that they made 36% more
serious medical errors than their counterparts who did not have shifts of 24 hours or
more and worked 20 fewer hours per week.37 On a larger scale, the Association of Pro-
fessional Sleep Societies’ Committee on Catastrophes, Sleep, and Public Policy reviewed
several disasters such as the Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear plant incidents and
the Space Shuttle Challenger accident and concluded that “sleep and sleep-related factors
appear to be involved in widely disparate types of disasters.”38 The report reviewed
research demonstrating that the tendency to want to sleep is greatest in the early morn-
ing hours and, to a lesser extent, in the midafternoon; during the disasters, individuals
made critical judgment errors in the early morning hours. The Committee noted that dur-
ing the two “vulnerable” periods of the day, neural processes controlling alertness and
sleep lessen the capacity of an individual to function and that “inadequate sleep, even as
little as 1 or 2 [hours] less than usual sleep, can greatly exaggerate the tendency for error
during the time zones of vulnerability.”39
DEPLETED RESOURCES
Glucose fuels the brain, and research shows that reflective processes demand more fuel
than reflexive processes. When glucose levels are low, individuals have a tendency to rely
more on reflexive decision-making strategies and have more difficulty summoning their
reflective system to check their decisions.40 Glucose is also depleted when exercising self-
control: Controlling attention, regulating emotions, resisting impulsivity, and coping with
stress have all been found to consume relatively large amounts of glucose.41 Thus both deci-
sion making and exercising self-control require glucose, and both can also deplete glucose
stores. Research shows that making many decisions can subsequently interfere with an indi-
vidual’s ability to exercise self-control, and conversely, that exercising self-control can lead
to less likelihood of engaging the effortful, reflective system in making decisions.42
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This research may explain the findings of a recent study that examined decision fatigue
among Israeli judges.43 The study found that the experienced parole-board judges’ deci-
sions fluctuated based on when cases were heard during the day. Cases heard early in the
morning and just after breaks (with meals) were more likely to end with a parole grant
than cases heard shortly before breaks and at the end of the day. That is, decisions tended
to default to the status quo of denying parole as the number of cases increased until
judges took a break. Because each break included a meal, it is not possible to say with cer-
tainty that it was the meal and not the “timeout” that affected subsequent decisions. But
research in this area suggests that the meal replenished glucose stores and thus con-
tributed to the change in “default” processing in cases following a break. In either case,
the study does suggest that “judicial decisions can be influenced by whether the judge
took a break to eat.”44
MOOD
Mood affects how an individual processes information. In general, those in a positive
mood engage in more reflexive, automatic processing, and those in a negative mood
engage in more reflective, deliberative processing.45 One explanation is that positive
moods enhance the default processing approach—the status quo—and negative moods
inhibit it.46 In many instances, as has been described earlier, individuals “default” to
reflexive processing; thus positive moods often are associated with reflexive processing.
If things are good, there is little motivation to engage in more effortful processing.
Reliance on stereotypes comes easily.47 A negative mood, on the other hand, signals a
problem situation that needs more focus and attention to detail. 
Based on their review of the literature, researchers Kimberly Elsbach and Pamela Barr
suggest that different moods are more suited for some purposes than others: “[P]ositive
moods are best suited for decision-making tasks that are interesting or require creativity
or efficiency, while negative moods are best suited for decision tasks that are effortful
and/or require careful consideration and analysis of a number of different issues and
potential outcomes.”48 The researchers also cite studies finding that individuals in a good
mood tend to be overly optimistic and self-confident in their own abilities. 
This is not to suggest that judges purposely summon a negative mood before taking the
bench. Individuals can override their spontaneous reliance on reflexive processing when
in a positive mood by being more vigilant. Research shows, for example, that specifically
instructing individuals to pay attention and holding individuals accountable for their
decisions can induce more effortful processing.49
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FLUENCY
Fluency refers to the ease with which individuals process information. People gener-
ally consider information that is processed more fluently as more accurate and true than
less fluent information.50 This holds true for a range of sensory and cognitive informa-
tion. For example, information written in an easy-to-read type is considered more accu-
rate than the same information written in a more difficult-to-process font. Likewise,
information that is familiar, easier to pronounce, and easier to retrieve from memory is
judged more true and likeable and individuals express more confidence in it, whatever its
actual content (and accuracy) may be. Much of advertising is based on the idea of flu-
ency—repeatedly showing the same information in easily processed ways. 
Psychologist Adam Alter and his colleagues demonstrated that fluency is associated
with reflexive information processing and disfluency is associated with more reflective
processing.51 In one of their studies, they asked participants to complete the Cognitive
Reflection Test, a series of three questions that seem to have initially easy answers but,
upon further reflection, require more systematic processing to obtain the correct
responses. For example, one question reads:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents52
The automatic response is 10 cents, but more careful consideration of the problem
reveals the correct answer to be 5 cents: If the ball costs 10 cents and the bat is $1.00 more
than the ball (i.e., $1.10), the total cost would be $1.20 rather than $1.10.53
The researchers gave some of the participants in the study the questions in an easy-to-
read font and other participants received the questions in a difficult-to-read font. Those
in the latter, disfluency group answered more items correctly. The researchers suggested
that the difficult font served as a cue to the reflective system that the task would require
more effort to process. Those in the easy-font group had no cue that more effortful pro-
cessing was required.
In the courtroom, Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie have demonstrated the potential
effects of fluency. In general, their research found that when individuals read case mate-
rials and were asked to come to a decision at the end (similar to the typical juror’s task),
the individuals develop narrative stories to understand the evidence. The researchers
manipulated the order of the evidence provided, making it easier or harder to develop a
coherent narrative. Consistent with the research on fluency, they found that the ease in
creating a narrative story affected “perceptions of evidence strength, judgments about
confidence, and the impact of information about witness credibility.”54 Decisions shifted
in the direction of the narratives that were easier to construct. 
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The influence of fluency on information processing is complex and situation specific.
For example, at least in some situations, individuals will discount fluency when they are
aware that it could be influencing their judgments.55 Thus it is important for judges to
learn about and be aware of the potential effects of fluency on their decisions. The poten-
tial for error based on fluency provides one more reason for judges to check their reflex-
ive processing.
MULTITASKING
We live in a society where multitasking is too often the norm. Teenagers often multi-
task when driving and texting, with dangerous results. The same may be true for the
results of decisions made by multitasking judges. 
For the brain, multitasking is not performing two or more tasks
simultaneously; rather, multitasking involves the rapid switching
from one task to another. Done in milliseconds, the brain post-
pones one task and sets up for the next.56 For more than 97% of the
population, this task switching has a cost in performance.57 Despite
numerous studies to the contrary, however, most individuals think
they are good at multitasking and that they are more efficient as a
result. Many judges are the same: even if they concede that multi-
tasking has a cost, many judges are quite good at articulating that—
for them—the cost is negligible and worth it. 
But researchers consistently find diminished performance by those who multitask. For
example, psychologists Jason Watson and David Strayer tested the performance of 200
individuals on a driving simulation task, a cognitive task involving memorization and
basic math problems, and a dual-task condition involving both the driving simulation
and the cognitive tasks.58 Performance measures on the individual tasks were signifi-
cantly better than those in the dual-task condition. The researchers found that a very
small percentage of the participants (2.5%) did not see their performance degrade in the
dual-task condition. However, they noted that these individuals are the exception and
cautioned readers about assuming they are one of the “supertaskers”: 
Indeed, our studies over the last decade have found that a great many
people have the belief that the laws of attention do not apply to them (e.g.,
they have seen other drivers who are impaired while multitasking, but they
themselves are the exception to the rule). In fact, some readers may also be
wondering whether they too are supertaskers; however, we suggest that the
odds of this are against them.59
Other studies have shown that more multitasking does not necessarily improve multi-
tasking skills. For example, a study from Stanford University researchers demonstrated
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Court Review - Volume 49 89
EXAMPLES OF MULTITASKING
WHILE ON THE BENCH
• Signing orders
• Reviewing documents and upcoming
cases
• Checking email or texts
• Surfing the Internet
• Talking with individuals not involved
in the present case
that individuals who commonly multitasked using different types of media had less atten-
tional control than light media multitaskers and were worse at task switching.60 High
media multitaskers had difficulty filtering out extraneous information and suppressing
task switching. Another study explored whether avid videogame players are better at mul-
titasking and found they, like nonvideogame players, performed worse during dual-task
conditions.61
Despite information that multitasking is less efficient, degrades performance, and may
be dangerous—Strayer and his colleagues found that the crash risk of using a “hands-
free” cell phone while driving is comparable to driving while intoxicated—individuals
still find it difficult not to multitask.62 Why? At least one reason is that it feels good. Ohio
State University researchers Zheng Wang and John Tchernev asked college students to
record their activities across 28 days and note why they were engaged in the activity and
what they experienced as a result.63 Though cognitive needs (e.g., gaining knowledge and
understanding) drove many media multitasking activities, the students did not report
that the activities satisfied those needs. Rather, the multitasking addressed emotional
needs (e.g., having a pleasurable experience). The researchers concluded that the emo-
tional gratification resulting from multitasking serves to reinforce more multitasking
behavior: “In this sense, the ‘myth’ of multitasking actually is partially caused by the ‘mis-
perception’ of the efficiency of multitasking and by positive feelings associated with the
behavior, which is emotionally satisfying but cognitively unproductive.”64
Task switching in the courtroom has the potential of distracting the judge and reduc-
ing performance, but it also carries with it the sense that the judge is not fully engaged
with the matter at hand. A central tenet of procedural fairness is that the judge is an active
listener. If the judge seems distracted with other matters, litigants will not feel that their
voice has been fully heard. A recent study by Harvard psychologists demonstrated the
importance of giving people voice.65 The researchers found that regions of the brain asso-
ciated with reward are activated when individuals are allowed to talk about themselves to
others. In an interview, Stanford multitasking researcher Clifford Nass also mused about
giving people attention: “[W]hen I grew up, the greatest gift you could give someone was
attention, and the best way to insult someone was to ignore them. . . . The greatest gift
was attention.” 66
60. Eyal Ophir et al., Cognitive Control in Media Multitaskers, 106 PRO-
CEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 15,583 (2009).
61. Sarah E. Donohue et al., Cognitive Pitfall! Videogame Players Are
Not Immune to Dual-Task Costs, 74 ATTENTION, PERCEPTION, & PSY-
CHOPHYSICS 803 (2012).
62. David L. Strayer, Frank A. Drews, & Dennis J. Crouch, A Com-
parison of the Cell Phone Driver and the Drunk Driver, 48 HUM. FAC-
TORS 381 (2006).
63. Zheng Wang and John M. Tchernev, The “Myth” of Media Multi-
tasking: Reciprocal Dynamics of Media Multitasking, Personal Needs,
and Gratifications, 62 J. COMMUNICATION 493 (2012).
64. Id. at 509-10.
65. Diana I. Tamir & Jason P. Mitchell, Disclosing Information About
the Self Is Intrinsically Rewarding, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8038
(2012).
66. Interview with Clifford Nass, FRONTLINE: DIGITAL NATION LIFE ON
THE DIGITAL FRONTIER (Feb. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/digitalnation/interviews
/nass.html.
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Almost everything a judge does involves processing information and making deci-sions. So if we are to improve our performance as judges, we must focus onimproving our performance of those tasks. 
Doing so can offer additional benefits as well. One aspect of being more mindful is
finding ways to relieve stress, which can interfere with information processing and deci-
sion making. Some judges may regard job stress as part of the job, but job stress also leads
to diminished physical health.67 Of course, consistent with our discussion in this paper,
stress also leads to a diminished capacity for good decision making.68
In the remainder of this paper, we suggest some strategies that may help judges be more
mindful and make better decisions:
• Focus on purpose. Sometimes the sheer press of business makes it difficult for a judge
to focus on the individual case. The primary purpose of court work becomes moving
cases as opposed to hearing them. Former Minnesota Chief Justice Kathleen Blatz, for
example, once compared the court’s work to a vegetable factory:
Instead of cans of peas, you’ve got cases. You just move ’em, move ’em,
move ’em. One of my colleagues on the bench said: “You know, I feel like
I work for McJustice: we sure aren’t good for you, but we are fast.”69
It is hard to be mindful when the focus is on getting through a docket, signing
orders, writing opinions, preparing a speech for a local community group, and any
number of other responsibilities that fall on a judge’s plate. The tendency is to focus on
the next task around the corner rather than the current one. Taking time—even just a
few minutes—to bring full attention to the matter at hand offers a check on reflexive,
automatic decision making and a step toward ensuring a fair process and a just out-
come. Administrative Judge Judy Harris Kluger makes this point in her story about
working in the busy New York City Criminal Court: 
You know, for a long time my claim to fame was that I arraigned 200
cases in one session. That’s ridiculous. When I was arraigning cases, I’d be
handed the papers, say the sentence is going to be five days, ten days,
whatever, never even looking at the defendant. At a community court, I’m
able to look up from the papers and see the person standing in front of me.
It takes two or three more minutes, but I think a judge is much more effec-
tive that way.70
In addition, judges who see their work not as the sum of the cases they move in a
particular day but as contributing to a fair and just court system are likely to find
67. E.g., Jo Ann Heydenfeldt, Linda Herkenhoff & Mary Coe, Mind
Fitness Training: Emerging Practices & Business Applications:
Applied Neuroscience, 1 INT’L J. HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI. 150, 150
(2011). 
68. Id.
69. Greg Berman, “What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway?” Problem Solv-
ing in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78, 80 (2000).
70. Id. at 81.
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more satisfaction in their work. Research shows that individuals who perceive their
work as significant and serving a greater purpose are likely to experience greater lev-
els of meaningfulness.71 Judges who see themselves as cogs in the system may bene-
fit from remembering their contributions to the larger system goals. Efficiency and
timeliness are important, but not at the expense of reflective decision making and pro-
cedural fairness. 
• Formalize and critique decision heuristics. Although the law may assume that deci-
sion makers review and weigh all relevant information in a systematic manner to reach
an optimal judgment, research demonstrates that is not the case. In a study of bail deci-
sions in England and Wales, for example, researchers found that a simple “matching
heuristic” explained decisions better than a more complex, integrated model of deci-
sion making. The matching heuristic relied primarily on three factors: bail decisions
could be predicted 92% of the time in one court, for example, by relying on (a) whether
the prosecutor opposed bail, (b) whether a previous court imposed conditions or
remanded in custody, and (c) whether police imposed conditions or remanded in cus-
tody. If the answer was yes to any of these, the magistrate’s decision was to deny bail.72
In another study, the findings showed that magistrates’ beliefs about their decision-
making process differed from their practice (i.e., relying on a simple heuristic), as indi-
cated by the following comments: 
For example, a lay magistrate wrote to us stating that “the situation . . .
depends on an enormous weight of balancing information, together with
our experience and training.” The chairman of the council said that “we
are trained to question, and to assess carefully the evidence we are given.”73
The use of simple heuristics to make complex decisions is not limited to law.
Physician Clement McDonald, for example, writes that doctors often rely on a subset
of information and extrapolate based on experience to make diagnoses and treatment
decisions. He notes that the lack of scientific information available on some drugs and
diseases requires doctors to develop heuristics. Rather than ignoring the use of heuris-
tics, he calls for the medical community to formalize them:
Exposing these heuristics to critical review so that they can be clarified,
improved, and standardized may reduce practice variation, thereby making
it easier to optimize the care process. Furthermore, we know that many of
the “everyday” heuristics described by Tversky and Kahneman are dys-
functional; careful examination of medical heuristics may reveal similar
problems and provide corrective insight.74
As an example of an everyday heuristic, he discusses how doctors tend to prescribe
a new drug when an older drug in the same class would do as well. He refers to this
“heuristic” as “newer is automatically better.” However, there are many examples of
71. Brent D. Rosso, Kathryn H. Dekas, & Amy Wrzesniewski, On the
Meaning of Work: A Theoretical Integration and Review, 30
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 91 (2010).
72. Mandeep K. Dhami, Psychological Models of Professional Decision
Making, 14 PSYCHOL SCI. 175 (2003).
73. Mandeep K. Dhami & Peter Ayton, Bailing and Jailing the Fast and
Frugal Way, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 141, 163 (2001).
74. Clement J. McDonald, Medical Heuristics: The Silent Adjudicators
of Clinical Practice, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 56, 57 (1996).
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new drugs that eventually were found to have additional side effects (or worse) only
after their widespread use across time. As a result, he proposes that the heuristic
should be to always use an old drug unless the patient cannot tolerate it or if specific
symptoms or other indications suggest that the old drug will not work. 
In the same way, judges can consider the “rules of thumb” they may be using to
process their cases, whether traffic, small claims, family, civil, or criminal. Are there
specific factors that cause one judge to put the defendant in custody at sentencing
while another does not? Does a defendant’s marital status have any bearing on a bail
decision? Like the English magistrates, do individual judges rely on certain primary
factors to decide cases? If so, what are they, and do their colleagues use the same
ones? One of the studies on bail decisions revealed that the magistrates sometimes
were inconsistent in their own decisions and disagreed with some of their colleagues
on the same cases.75 Taking time to reflectively identify and rely on decision heuris-
tics that are transparent and predictable across cases and judges could go a long way
to enhancing litigant perceptions of fairness.76
• Be mindful and read the dials. Practicing the principles of procedural fairness
requires focus and attention, which may be hard to come by if a judge is tired or hun-
gry, is multitasking, or is not in a mood to engage in effortful processing. Taking stock
of such distracting factors serves as a reminder that more concentration may be neces-
sary. Periodically “reading the dials” helps identify distractions and potential ways to
lessen their effects. For example, does the temperature in the courtroom need to be
adjusted or noise in the hallways reduced? Is it time for a break? Sometimes little
annoyances become irritating distractions and unwittingly raise the level of tension in
the courtroom. Sometimes the judge just wants to “push through” the remaining cases
when a break would be best for all.
Some judges and lawyers have adopted a practice of “mindfulness” to strengthen
their ability to read the dials.77 Researchers from Harvard describe the practice of
mindfulness as meditation that “encompasses focusing attention on the experience
of thoughts, emotions, and body sensations, simply observing them as they arise and
pass away.”78 Other researchers note that “mindfulness is thought to enable one to
respond to situations more reflectively (as opposed to reflexively).”79
Mindfulness practice is essentially exercise for the brain. Meditation can be done
while sitting, standing, or walking. A common meditation practice involves sitting
quietly and concentrating on the breath. Individuals try to identify when their mind
wanders from focusing on the experience of breathing; and, once they do, they return
the mind’s focus to the breath. As they practice this sequence over and over, they
75. Dhami & Ayton, supra note 73.
76. Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 17 (Gerd
Gigerenzer & Christoph Engel eds., 2006). 
77. See, e.g., Mindfulness in Law Web site at http://mindfulness
inlaw.com/Home.html; The Institute for Mindfulness Studies, The
Mindful Judge website at http://themindfuljudge.com/Home.html;
Amanda Enayati, Seeking Serenity: When Lawyers Go Zen, CNN
HEALTH (May 11, 2011), http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/
11/seeking-serenity-when-lawyers-go-zen/; and Leonard L.
Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of
Mindfulness Mediation to Law Students, Lawyers, and Their Clients,
7 NEGOTIATION L. REV. 1 (2002)
78. Britta K. Hölzel et al., How Does Mindfulness Meditation Work?
Proposing Mechanisms of Action from a Conceptual and Neural Per-
spective, 6 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 537, 538 (2011).
79. Scott R. Bishop et al., Mindfulness: A Proposed Operational Defini-
tion, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 230, 232 (2004).
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gradually learn to recognize the thoughts and emotions that pull their attention away
and are able to regain focus more easily. Research by psychologist Amishi Jha and her
colleagues shows that the ability to focus attention is evident after just thirty min-
utes of practice a day for eight weeks.80 As with physical exercise, the longer indi-
viduals practice mindfulness meditation, the more skilled they become.81
Bob Stahl and Elisha Goldstein offer another mindfulness practice to help indi-
viduals take a quick look at the dials. They refer to it as the STOP meditation.82 The
STOP acronym reminds individuals to:
Stop what they are currently doing,
Take a deep breath and focus on the sensation of breathing,
Observe what they are thinking, feeling, and doing, and 
Proceed with new awareness.
Judges can use this quick pause throughout the day, especially when they find
themselves getting distracted, bored, or overwhelmed. The pause helps to refocus
attention and reaffirm the priority to ensure each case is given a fair process. 
In 2002, attorney Douglas Codiga expressed concern that judges and attorneys’
misconceptions about mindfulness being mystical or otherworldly, requiring a com-
mitment to Buddhism, or amounting to just another stress-reduction technique
would lessen its potential to impact the field.83 Contrary to these misconceptions, he
argued that mindfulness is compatible with legal principles of reason, analysis, and
skepticism; does not conflict with preexisting religious beliefs and requires no com-
mitment to Buddhism; and, in addition to reducing stress and improving lawyering
skills, would help legal professionals develop insights regarding their entire lives. 
Since Codiga’s article, additional research has been undertaken demonstrating the
potential for mindfulness meditation to improve psychological well-being in addi-
tion to its effectiveness in treating a range of physical and psychological disorders.84
No doubt these good findings have contributed to the adoption of mindfulness prac-
tices in a variety of settings such as medicine, education, business, the military, and,
as noted earlier, by some in the legal profession.85 And recently Supreme Court Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer revealed to CNN’s Amanda Enyati that he routinely “pauses”
twice each day: 
80. Amishi P. Jha, Jason Krompinger, & Michael J. Baime, Mindfulness
Training Modifies Subsystems of Attention, 7 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE,
& BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 109 (2007).
81. Alberto Chiesa, Raffaella Calati, & Alessandro Serreti, Does Mind-
fulness Training Improve Cognitive Abilities? A Systematic Review of
Neuropsychological Findings, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. R. 449 (2011).
82. See STOP meditation demonstrated at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=EiuTpeu5xQc. See generally ELISHA GOLDSTEIN, THE NOW
EFFECT: HOW THIS MOMENT CAN CHANGE THE REST OF YOUR LIFE
(2012); BOB STAHL & ELISHA GOLDSTEIN, A MINDFULNESS-BASED
STRESS REDUCTION WORKBOOK (2010).
83. Douglas A. Codiga, Reflections on the Potential Growth of Mindfulness
Meditation in the Law, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 109 (2002).
84. Hölzel et al., supra note 78.
85. See, e.g., David Gelles, The Mind Business, FINANCIAL TIMES MAGA-
ZINE (Aug. 24, 2012), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
2/d9cb7940-ebea-11e1-985a-00144feab49a.html#axzz27af4lcAI;
Luke Fortney & Molly Taylor, Meditation in Medical Practice: A
Review of the Evidence and Practice, 37 PRIMARY CARE: CLINICS
OFFICE PRAC. 81 (2010); Daniel Schneider, “Mindfulness” Helps
Soldiers Cope in Iraq, U.S. DEP’T DEFENSE (Aug. 3, 2010), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=60294;
Patricia Leigh Brown, In the Classroom, a New Focus on Quieting
the Mind, NY TIMES (June 16, 2007), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/16/us/16mindful.html?ex=1183
608000&en=3d87faf9c47eb9f2&ei=5070&_r=0.
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I don’t know that what I do is meditation, or even whether it has a name. For
10 or 15 minutes twice a day I sit peacefully. I relax and think about nothing or as
little as possible. And that is what I’ve done for a couple of years. . . . And really I
started because it’s good for my health. My wife said this would be good for your
blood pressure and she was right. It really works. I read once that the practice of
law is like attempting to drink water from a fire hose. And if you are under stress,
meditation—or whatever you choose to call it—helps. Very often I find myself in
circumstances that may be considered stressful, say in oral arguments where I
have to concentrate very hard for extended periods. If I come back at lunchtime,
I sit for 15 minutes and perhaps another 15 minutes later. Doing this makes me
feel more peaceful, focused and better able to do my work.86
• Use decision aids. At first blush the idea of using a decision aid, like a checklist or
benchcard, seems so mundane.  But lessons from other professions such as medicine
and aviation demonstrate their incredible potential for improving performance. Physi-
cian Atul Gawande, for example, tells the story of how simple checklists (requiring
steps such as washing hands with soap and fully covering the patient with sterile
drapes) implemented in Michigan hospital intensive care units saved over 1,500 lives
and an estimated $175 million dollars in costs.87
Judges sometimes use checklists to decide substantive issues, but judges might
also benefit from having procedural checklists.88 In busy courtrooms with crowded
dockets, a judge can easily fail to cover an essential piece of information that a defen-
dant must be told before a plea may be voluntarily entered. Even so, this is one of
those areas in which the judge should think carefully about both procedural fairness
and crossing off all the necessary subjects on the checklist. It’s important that the
defendant actually understand the rights he or she is giving up, not just answering
“yes” to a series of questions obviously intended to get an affirmative response (“Do
you understand . . . ?). 
Other tools based on evidence-based practices, such as risk and needs assessments,
can be helpful to judges in making sentencing and probation-revocation decisions.89
Research demonstrates that standardized, objective assessment instruments enhance
decision making across a wide variety of professional decisions.90 Researchers
Stephen Gottfredson and Laura Moriarty suggest the following reasons, in part based
on reflexive processing, for the superiority of statistical methods of prediction com-
pared to intuitive methods: decision makers may not use information reliably, may
not attend to base rates, may inappropriately weight predictive items, may weight
items that are not predictive, and may be influenced by causal attributions or spuri-
ous correlations.”91
86. Enyati, supra note 77.
87. Atul Gawande, The Checklist, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/12/10/
071210fa_fact_gawande; see also ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST
MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2011).
88. For examples of substantive-law checklists, see Guthrie, Rachlin-
ski & Wistrich, supra note 22, at 40.
89. Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, & Jennifer K. Elek. Using
Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing:
Guidance for Courts from a National Working Group, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (2011), available at
ht tp : / /www.ncsc .o rg / Se r v i c e s - and -Exper t s /~ /med i a /
Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/Areas%20of%20exper
tise/Sentencing%20Probation/RNA%20Guide%20Final.ashx. 
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arial Judgments in Criminal Justice Decisions: Should One Replace
the Other?, 70 FED. PROBATION 15 (2006), available at
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91. Id.
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Some of the Michigan doctors in Dr. Gawande’s report balked at having to follow
checklists, complaining that they were too busy, already knew what the procedures
were, or were more interested in trying out new techniques and procedures. Judges
may feel that way, too—concerned about slowing the process down to follow a
checklist or thinking they can handle the process fine without the tool. But appellate
judges see the other end of the process when they reverse decisions because simple
steps were not followed. No one benefits when a case is sent back a year or two later
because a simple step was missed.
Decision tools are just that—tools. Used properly, they can help ensure fair proce-
dures and just outcomes; used incorrectly, they can impair the process. A judge who
goes on automatic, for example, merely reading off a checklist and not giving eye
contact or listening to litigants and lawyers will not be practicing procedural fairness
even if he or she is not overturned on appeal. 
• Seek feedback and foster accountability. Judges suffer from a lack of feedback. They
seldom know the results of their decisions. Even when a judge’s decision is reviewed
by an appellate court, the lag time between making the decision and getting appellate
feedback diminishes the value of the information. Individuals benefit the most when
feedback is immediate. 
Because feedback is essential to learning and developing expertise, judges should
seek and courts should provide opportunities to obtain feedback. Judges cannot
improve decisions when they do not know what is and is not working. Does the
court have access to outcome data on, for example, pretrial release, sentencing, and
probation revocation decisions? What are the trends in the data? What cases most
often result in failure to appeal or rearrest, and what decision heuristics might be
guiding the cases?  The court could also collect information on litigant satisfaction
using a survey such as the National Center for State Courts’ CourTools Access and
Fairness Measure.92 The results of the survey would indicate whether judges’ assess-
ments of their practice of procedural fairness principles are consistent with litigants’
assessments. 
Judges also could be videotaped periodically or observed by a mentor or colleague.
A neutral observer more likely will be able to identify mistakes in reasoning or
instances where procedural fairness practices could be strengthened.93 Dr. Gawande
found that, after eight years as a surgeon, he seemed to have reached a plateau, so he
sought out one of his former teachers—since retired—to observe him and act as a
coach. The “coach” spent 20 minutes explaining what he observed that Gawande was-
n’t aware of, giving Gawande “more to consider and work on” than Gawande had
come up with on his own for several years.94 Judges might well benefit from a similar
practice. More specifically, sentencing roundtables where judges discuss hypothetical
cases also could reveal different patterns of decision making and use of heuristics. The
92. National Center for State Courts, CourTools: Measure 1, Access and
Fairness (2005), available at http://www.courtools.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/CourTools/courtools_Trial_measure1_access_and
_fairness.ashx.
93. Brest & Krieger, supra note 10, at 635.
94. Atul Gawande, Personal Best: Top Athletes and Singers Have
Coaches. Should You?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 2011, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/10/03/111003fa_fact_
gawande?currentPage=all.  
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purpose of such reviews is to analyze and reflect on the information; research shows
that the combination of reflection and feedback enhances subsequent performance.95
In addition, research shows that accountability can lead to more effortful, reflec-
tive processing of information. Researcher Eileen Braman explains:
Put another way, accountability tends to heighten accuracy motivations.
When we know others are watching, we want to “get things right” and we
also strive to use appropriate decision criteria to avoid criticisms that may
be raised down the line.96
There are exceptions to the positive influence of accountability on performance such
as when decision makers conform their decisions to the known views of those review-
ing their decisions or when decision makers lack the knowledge to make specific deci-
sions.97 Generally, however, accountability attenuates bias in decision making. 
One suggestion for holding judges accountable is to require that they provide an
explanation for their decision, preferably in writing. Guthrie and his colleagues argue
that “the discipline of opinion writing might enable well-meaning judges to over-
come their intuitive, impressionistic reactions.”98 Research also shows that individu-
als who were required to justify each step in a decision process performed better.99
To the extent that judges ask themselves “why” at each point in their decision
process and consider alternatives, their decisions will be the result of more effortful
and deliberate processing.  And to the extent that they are willing to engage in
obtaining and using feedback from others, as discussed above, they will enhance a
culture of accountability.
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sistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CAL. L. REV. 629
(2011). This article is by design lightly footnoted; I refer the inter-
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he or she can blindly and dispassionately administer equal justice
for all”).
8. John Yoo, Closing Arguments: Obama Needs a Neutral Justice, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 10, 2009, at C3.
9. Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by
Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12.
10. Sotomayor Confirmation Hearings, at 71, 120 (statement of J.
Sonia Sotomayor). 
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 226 (2001).
As a Supreme Court Justice once wrote, “dispassionatejudges” are “mythical beings,” like “Santa Claus orUncle Sam or Easter bunnies.”1 Judges have emotions,
and emotions influence decision making. These observations
may seem obvious, even banal. But their implications are
broad-reaching. Judicial emotion is more common than most
people—certainly laypeople, and perhaps judges as well—
would like to believe. Further, emotion almost certainly has a
substantial impact on judicial decision making and behavior—
and that is not necessarily a bad thing.
The ideal of the emotionless, “dispassionate” judge has a very
long pedigree. More than three centuries ago, Thomas Hobbes
wrote in Leviathan that the ideal judge is “divested of all fear,
anger, hatred, love, and compassion.”2 To a modern ear such a
blunt statement sounds, perhaps, antiquated. To the extent this
is so, it is because the Legal Realists of the early twentieth cen-
tury largely convinced us of the importance of the person wear-
ing the robe. Law is not certain, and judges have discretion,
within which space ostensibly “alogical” or “non-rational”
forces have room to operate.3 As the great Benjamin Cardozo
once mused, “Deep below consciousness are other forces, the
likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the
complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions,
which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.”4
In our post-Realist world, such frank acknowledgment of
judges’ humanity is relatively commonplace. As other contri-
butions to this special issue make clear,5 judges are affected by
factors as diverse as fatigue and life experiences, and they
deploy common (but sometimes misleading) decision-making
shortcuts known as heuristics. Judges are likely no better than
ordinary humans at multitasking or truth-telling. An entire
academic cottage industry is devoted to ascertaining the deci-
sional influence of personal characteristics such as gender and
political party. 
But we still seldom talk about the emotional aspect of judges’
humanity. And when we do, we run into a fairly solid wall of
opposition. Judicial emotion generally is seen as an unfortunate
consequence of having to populate the legal system with falli-
ble, biased, real people. Indeed, emotion traditionally has been
counted among the primary sources of fallibility and bias. A
Maryland judge expressed this well: “Judges, being flesh and
blood, are subject to the same emotions and human frailties as
affect other members of the species.”6 The task of the legal sys-
tem, under this contemporary view, is to systematically reduce
the opportunities for judicial emotion to insert itself; the task of
the good judge is to prevent emotion from exerting any influ-
ence wherever such opportunities remain. 
We saw this view vividly articulated during the 2009 nomi-
nation of now-Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who some feared
would have an overly “empathic” judging style. One senator
implied that judges’ emotions posed a threat to liberty;7 a
prominent professor declared that a “compassionate, empa-
thetic judge was very likely to be a bad judge”;8 a journalist
noted that the mere suggestion that emotion might affect judg-
ing was “radioactive.”9 Even among Sotomayor’s supporters,
defense of empathy (or any emotional influence) was tepid at
best. She was finally able to put the issue to rest by offering a
standard post-Realist narrative: that while judges are not
“robots” and do have feelings, a good judge recognizes those
feelings and puts them aside.10
Certainly, judges are not robots, so the first half of that story
is correct. But what if the latter part is wrong? What if emo-
tion—at least sometimes—offers something of value to judicial
decision making? Judge Richard A. Posner has suggested as
much, writing that judges ought not try to become “emotion-
less, like computers,” because feelings might sometimes be
necessary to good judging.11 Justice William J. Brennan simi-
larly asserted that good judgment flows from a “dialogue of
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(Ohio App. 5 Dist. Jul. 22, 2009) (Delaney, J. concurring) (“I am
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as judge, I must not let my feelings, my emotions … influence my
review and application of the law.”).
reason and passion.”12 If that is so, what might that dialogue
sound like?
These are questions that law need not—indeed, cannot—
answer on its own. A rich and fast-growing body of literature
on the role of emotion in human life offers insight and guid-
ance. Indeed, the study of emotion is one of the fastest-grow-
ing sectors within psychology and neuroscience. This explo-
sion in the “affective sciences” joins a resurgence of interest in
the topic within philosophy, history, and sociology. The con-
sensus from outside law is clear. Emotion’s impact on decision
making and behavior can be (and usually is) positive, even
indispensible. Emotion’s impact can also be detrimental,
depending on factors such as intensity, duration, and—most
critically—context. Drawing on these interdisciplinary
insights, we can think in a coherent way about when emotion
might help a judge perform her job better, when it might hin-
der job performance, and how a judge might tell the difference. 
This short article offers the judge a roadmap for thinking
about the role of emotion in judicial decision making. It first
presents the limited empirical evidence drawn from judges
themselves, demonstrating that coping with emotional chal-
lenges is an unrecognized aspect of judges’ work. It goes on to
describe what the affective sciences teach us about emotions’
impact on human decision making and behavior. To make the
discussion concrete, the article periodically applies those
insights to the phenomenon of judicial anger. Finally, an analy-
sis of emotional regulation strategies offers a concrete path by
which judges can learn to maximize helpful iterations of emo-
tion and minimize destructive ones.
COPING WITH EMOTIONAL CHALLENGES: AN UNDER-
APPRECIATED ASPECT OF JUDGING
Judges, particularly trial judges, often have to manage the
emotions of other people. Distraught victims and witnesses
have to be attended to; disruptive family members or criminal
defendants must be cautioned, disciplined, or removed; angry
disputes between lawyers need to be mediated or broken up.13
Judges are asked to filter out emotional influences, such as dis-
turbing evidence and provocative buttons or t-shirts worn by
spectators, if there is a risk that a jury’s emotions might be
manipulated or inflamed.14 Indeed, trial judges may be called
upon to instruct jurors about how to handle their emotions
during deliberations.15
While the legal system recognizes that handling the emo-
tions of others is part of a judge’s
job, it tends to ignore something
just as important: the fact that
judges, too, have emotions to
handle.16 Misbehaving lawyers
and litigants can make judges
angry. Disturbing evidence may
affect a judge as much as it does
a juror. The stories of litigants’
unhappy lives can trigger sad-
ness. Judges might feel frus-
trated, even depressed, when
they are unable to fix all the ills
paraded before them. As one has written, “[S]ometimes [the
judge] has to just sit up there and watch justice fail right in
front of him, right in his own courtroom, and he doesn’t know
what to do about it, and it makes him feel sad. . . . Sometimes
he even gets angry about it.”17 Litigation generally follows harm
or grievance, meaning that such unpleasant emotions are
nowhere in short supply. 
Fortunately, judges also experience more pleasant emotions.
They may feel joy when a suffering child is placed with a fam-
ily, or hope when a drug-court defendant completes treatment
and begins to turn his life around. Presiding over naturaliza-
tion ceremonies for new Americans is an occasion for grati-
tude, even a soaring feeling that psychologists call “eleva-
tion.”18 Crafting a tightly reasoned, well-written opinion can
generate pride. Simply feeling like you are doing a good job,
even under trying circumstances, can be a source of deep sat-
isfaction. The emotions a judge feels will be as varied as the
cases she hears.
Because our legal culture expects judicial “dispassion,”
however, judges do not often disclose their emotional reactions
or discuss how they process them. As that taboo breaks down,
we may see increased space for much-needed empirical work
exploring those issues. As things stand today, we must glean
clues from rare moments of candor. 
Those moments show that emotion infuses many aspects of
judges’ work. Judges sometimes note their emotions before
declaring an intention to override them.19 With the prolifera-
tion of cameras in courtrooms, coinciding with the growth of
social-media outlets, the public has developed an appetite for
intemperate displays, gleefully referred to as “benchslaps.” In
burial disputes, which often involve grisly details and vitriolic
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family dynamics, judges have
voiced the “dismay,” “sympa-
thy,” and “difficulties and
embarrassment” with which
they grapple.20 Recently, several
prominent federal judges have
disclosed that they find crimi-
nal sentencing to be particu-
larly infused with emotion.21
While trial-level work in the state criminal and family
courts may provide the steadiest flow of emotion-triggering sit-
uations, no judge is immune. Highly publicized instances of
intra-court animosity, including in the appellate courts, some-
times shine an unflattering light on the role of personal feel-
ings.22 Even the highly cloistered appellate environment of the
U.S. Supreme Court has an emotional life. Justice David Souter
reportedly cried during the process of deciding Bush v. Gore,23
and Justice Clarence Thomas, not known for public displays of
emotion, has said that “some cases . . . will drive you to your
knees.”24
Data from two small case studies further illuminate the real-
ity of judicial emotion. In the first, Australian magistrate
judges answered a survey about various aspects of their
work.25 Much like state trial-court judges in the U.S. system,
Australian magistrates handle the majority of civil and crimi-
nal actions. These judges reported expending significant effort
to manage their emotions, most of which were negative. One,
for example, characterized his work as “seeing absolute misery
passing in front of you day in, day out, month in, month out,
year in, year out.”26 Another reflected thus on working with
child-welfare cases:
I have a problem walking away and just erasing
everything I’ve heard about families and the stress that
they’re under, the treatment children have been dished
out, what will happen to them for the rest of their lives.
I just find it difficult to walk away from that and go
home to my own children and look at them and think
“Oh, God”, you know. I usually find I try to be more
patient with my own children when I go home after a
day in the [family court]. So it’s just the sadness; there is
no good news.27
Similar sentiments were expressed by a small group of Min-
nesota state judges asked to reflect on victim-impact state-
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ments.28 The researchers described one response thus:
One judge . . . recalled a DWI case in which a
young child [had] almost lost his life. His mother deliv-
ered an impact statement in which she described how
she thought her son was going to die. “I remember
thinking,” the judge said, “I am going to cry.” But he
regained what he thought was necessary composure
because “you are not supposed to cry on the bench
when you are a judge.”29
Other Minnesota judges reported feeling frustration, anger,
and compassion, emotions prompted both by the underlying
facts and by the victim-impact statements. 
Importantly, both the Australian and Minnesotan judges
reported that they found the work of regulating their emotions
to be difficult. One magistrate offered a particularly stark
assessment:
Now, there’s two things that can happen to you. Either
you’re going to remain a decent person and become ter-
ribly upset by it all because your emotions—because
your feelings are being pricked by all of this constantly or
you’re going to become—you’re going to grow a skin on
you as thick as a rhino, in which case I believe you’re
going to become an inadequate judicial officer because
once you lose the human—the feeling for humanity you
can’t really—I don’t believe you can do the job.30
This perception of nothing but bad options was, unfortu-
nately, echoed by the Minnesota judges. Some reported feeling
that, as the legal system tends “to strip away emotions,” they
were “working in a factory of sorts in which we are just grind-
ing these cases out,” causing them to worry that they were
becoming “insulated and numb” in the process.31
These windows into judges’ experience suggest that their
work often prompts an emotional response; that such
responses are often unpleasant; that managing those emotions
is difficult; and that these challenges have an impact on how
the judge acts in the moment and on how she feels about her
work in the longer term. These voices also strongly suggest
that judges feel inadequately trained and supported in this
aspect of their work. 
Fortunately, insights from the affective sciences can help
change this rather bleak assessment.
Thus, emotion embodies
thought, often complex and
even culturally scripted thought,
and those thoughts can be evalu-
ated just like any others.34
Again, the example of anger is
helpful. Whether we approve or
disapprove of an angry person
depends on whether we think
her perception of the triggering
event is accurate—that is,
whether the event really
occurred as she believes it did—
and whether her judgments strike us as warranted—that is,
whether the event really constitutes a wrong of which a person
rightfully should disapprove. 
Thus, emotion reveals what a person is thinking. It reveals
her reasons.
Emotion motivates action in service of reasons. Emotions
do not simply reflect passive assessment of what we perceive to
be happening in the world; they prompt us to respond to that
world. The idea in the sciences is that we evolved capacity for
emotion in order to maximize survival chances, and we now
use that capacity to propel us in the direction of a wider vari-
ety of goals. Fear provides a nice example. If you perceive that
a grizzly bear is approaching, your perceptions and resulting
thoughts will spur fear. Fear will focus your attention on the
bear and prompt you to evaluate its relevance to your goals—
for example, the desire not to be mauled or killed. Fear then
enables responsive action, including patterns of bodily
response (like fleeing), as well as typified facial expressions
(grimacing) and verbalizations (screaming) that signal your
emotional state to others. This is a rather primal example, but
the same principle holds for all emotions. Feeling love toward
an infant, for example, tends to motivate actions designed to
keep the baby alive and thriving, and feeling guilty about hav-
ing wronged a friend tends to show itself in a pained face,
which can communicate a desire to repair the relationship. 
Thus, emotion not only reflects thoughts; it serves as an
adaptive signal that something of import to a person’s flour-
ishing is at stake and activates a real-time response.
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ranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified by the circum-
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EMOTION AND DECISION MAKING: INSIGHTS FROM
PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE32
The first insight the legal system would do well to internal-
ize is that we need not ask judges to “strip away” their emo-
tions, because those emotions offer something of value.
Contemporary scholarship outside of law has generated a
consensus that emotion is an evolved, adaptive mechanism, nec-
essary for survival, social cohesion, and practical reason. This
consensus is rapidly eroding the stark division between reason
and emotion that traditionally has held sway in both the sci-
ences and in law. As I explain briefly below, emotion reveals rea-
sons, motivates action in service of reasons, and enables reason. 
Emotion reveals reasons. This insight flows from what psy-
chologists refer to as the “cognitive-appraisal” theory. This the-
ory focuses on the “aboutness” of any given emotion. Emo-
tions are not random; rather, they are directed at objects. We
love our mothers, for instance, and the specificity of that love
is how we experience the concept of “love.” Further, every
emotion has a basic underlying thought and belief structure—
an “appraisal”—which is an important way in which we dis-
tinguish them from one another. Anger, for example, reflects a
judgment that someone has wrongly threatened or damaged
something or someone that we value. In contrast, we feel sad
when we perceive an irreversible loss, or guilty when we per-
ceive ourselves to have done wrong. 
It is helpful to think of appraisal structure as akin to the the-
ory of universal grammar. Human language is built of a rela-
tively constrained set of grammatical elements—nouns versus
verbs, function versus lexical words, and so on—but different
cultures fill in different content, making our languages dis-
tinct. Similarly, all humans appear to have a common core of
basic emotions underlain by highly similar appraisal struc-
tures, but how we fill in those structures can vary. What makes
one person afraid might make another person happy. This is
not because these two people have radically different concepts
of fear and happiness; rather, they have radically different ideas
as to what states of the world satisfy the conditions that trigger
those emotions.33 In the case of anger, what constitutes a per-
ceived wrong will vary; who we consider part of the group on
whose behalf it is right to be angry will vary; even the proper
goal to be advanced by anger—for example, vindicating honor
or broadcasting moral judgment—will vary. 
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Emotion enables reason.
Finally, one of the most cutting-
edge implications of modern
research is that emotion and
reason are intertwined, such
that the latter can’t fully be real-
ized without the former. Neuro-
science, for example, has
shown that people with particu-
lar sorts of brain disease and
injury show a decline in both
emotional capacity and sub-
stantive rationality.35 Extreme
emotional deficits in such people are strongly correlated with
inability to engage in vital forms of reasoning—evidenced, for
example, by inability to make appropriate, self-interested
choices in a simple gambling task. They become unable to sup-
press inappropriate actions, to understand and respond to
social cues, and to advance their own interests and preferences.
In other words, social and emotional competence can be dev-
astated while more purely cognitive capacities, like logic,
remain intact. 
Emotion also appears necessary to moral judgment. A cre-
ative series of experiments involving the classic philosophical
“trolley problem” illustrate that phenomenon.36 In the trolley
problem people are asked to choose between two options. The
first is to flip a switch to divert an out-of-control trolley, killing
a worker on the diversion track but saving five people in its
original path. The second option is to push a human being off
a bridge so that he lands in front of the trolley, saving the five
but killing him. In either case the cold calculation is the same:
save five lives by sacrificing one. Most normal people, though,
think option one is moral, even necessary, while option two is
immoral. The differential? Emotion. The heightened emotional
salience of person-pushing accounts for an overwhelming pref-
erence for switch-flipping. Psychopathy provides another
example of emotion’s relevance to morality. The antisocial and
amoral behavior typifying serial murderers and other psy-
chopaths correlates at the neural level with a lack of normal
emotional response.37 Psychopaths’ moral indifference mirrors
their emotional indifference.
In short, emotion is not the enemy of reason. They are inter-
dependent. Not only does reason facilitate and shape emotion,
but each plays a vital role in our ability competently to navi-
gate the world, including our capacity for substantive rational-
ity and moral judgment. This is as true for judges as it is for
human beings generally. 
Emotion is not always a positive force. The prior discussion
has highlighted the overall positive contribution of emotion.
Given the generally negative narrative we have inherited in our
legal culture, it is important to spell out the parameters of that
contribution. But, of course, the negative narrative has to have
some truth to it. 
Indeed, it often has a lot of truth to it. Another insight from
the sciences is that all human tendencies and capacities that
are adaptive most of the time are maladaptive some of the time.
The common decisional heuristics described elsewhere in this
special issue fit into that category: quick, efficient guides to
judgment that work quite well in many situations but pre-
dictably lead to error in a small set of others. This is certainly
true of emotion.38
By way of illustration, recall the story of the approaching
grizzly bear. Fear quickly narrows attention to sources of threat
(the bear) and opportunity (escape routes), to the exclusion of
other stimuli. That attentional effect is vital, but it has costs.
For example, you will be far less able to perceive and remem-
ber less emotionally vivid aspects of the situation, like an
important conversation you were having just before you saw
the bear. The emotion needs to be intense to do its job, but as
a result you might not notice the ditch standing between you
and the escape route. 
Similarly, different emotionally infused mood states tend to
dispose us to different decisional styles, which might be disad-
vantageous in particular situations. Moods are experiential
states that are more generalized, longer-lasting, and less object-
driven than emotions: think of the difference between feeling
“down” and being concretely sad about the death of a beloved
pet. Because emotions and moods are so closely related,
though, they often are studied together. Often what starts as a
discrete emotion will morph into a mood (you are sad that
your dog died, and it makes you feel down for a long time for
no particular reason), or our moods predispose us to experi-
ence discrete emotions (you feel down, so you find more
things to be sad about). Moods, unfortunately, can be mis-
matched with the decisional demands we face at any given
moment. This, too, is a nice insight raised elsewhere in this
special issue, in which it is noted that certain moods “are best
suited for decision-making tasks that are interesting or require
creativity or efficiency,” while others are “best suited for deci-
sion tasks that are effortful and/or require careful consideration
and analysis.”39 In an example of particular relevance to
judges, people in sad moods tend to scrutinize evidence more
carefully than do happy or angry people, meaning that happi-
ness, anger, and their associated moods can sometimes con-
tribute to blind spots. This is why Judge Posner once warned
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that we ought to “beware the happy or the angry judge!”40
Finally, very intense emotion can sometimes lead us astray
and even defeat our goals. Fear can paralyze; sadness can over-
whelm; love can blind. This reality is so evident from our lives
that it needs no further comment here.
A full understanding of emotion’s impact, then, requires us
to consider both what it offers and what it might take away. Rec-
ognizing emotion’s value is critical, given how thoroughly we’ve
disparaged it to date. That does not mean we should give it free
rein. The capacity to regulate emotion is a skill every bit as crit-
ical as is the capacity to feel emotion. 
THE PLUSES AND MINUSES OF EMOTION FOR JUDGES
These fundamental understandings about the nature and
function of emotion clearly matter to judges as people. An emo-
tionally well-adjusted judge is likely to have better physical
health, happier work-life balance, and more functional personal
relationships. Like caring for the body, caring for emotional
health helps us achieve more satisfying lives.
The remainder of this article, though, focuses how these
insights affect judges as judges—that is, in the concrete context
of judicial work settings. After extending the prior discussion to
judicial emotion, using anger as the primary example,41 the arti-
cle goes on to explain how judges can most effectively regulate
the emotions they are bound to have. 
First, one benefit of an emotion for judges is that it signals
seriousness, both internally and externally. Consider anger.
Angering events are vivid, which sends a signal that something
important is happening. Whereas some emotions have a strong
withdrawal tendency—for example, disgust makes us back
away—anger keeps us engaged, meaning that it focuses the
judge’s attention to the offending person and situation. Anger
also communicates seriousness to others. Its typical physical
manifestations—raised voice, clenched eyebrows, narrowed eyes,
a scowl, and tensed muscles—are extraordinarily potent commu-
nicative devices. Anger conveys power. Thus, the emotion sends
important signals both to the judge and from the judge.
Second, anger motivates us to assign blame and conse-
quences. It is tightly bound up with an urge to restore justice.
Further, anger makes us more willing to take risks, in part
because it is associated with optimism and feelings of being in
control. Indeed, experimental studies show that people prefer
being in an angry state when faced with a confrontational task,
because anger helps them take on and succeed at the con-
frontation. It also literally heats us up, to prepare the body and
mind for action—think of that telltale “boiling” feeling. Thus,
anger facilitates both judgment and action.
These attributes are of obvious utility to judges—indeed, one
is tempted to say they are necessary, or even that anger is quin-
tessentially judicial. A judge often is asked to assign blame and
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consequences, which anger can
help her do. It can also help her
take necessary risks. Judges
sometimes have to alienate
powerful interests, upset poten-
tial voters, disappoint decent
people who have been wronged,
and even jeopardize public
safety. The late Judge John
Sprizzo of the Southern District
of New York, for example, once
expressed fury at having to
release high-level drug dealers because of fatal flaws in the
indictment.42 Similarly, some judges reported recently that
they hesitated in sanctioning police officers who had commit-
ted blatant perjury, citing a fear of ruining careers or conferring
an undeserved benefit on defendants. Anger at the officers’
abuse of the system helped them do what was right, not what
was easy.43
Anger can also keep the judge’s mind in the courtroom, so
to speak. Given the welter of stimuli and stressors to which
judges are exposed, they may need emotion to flag possible
misconduct, direct attention to it, and keep attention from sag-
ging. Moreover, anger’s expressive benefits are strategically
invaluable. Consider the difference between quietly suggesting
that a lawyer stop making improper objections despite
repeated instructions not to do so and smacking your hand on
the bench and using a sharp tone. 
Anger is not the only emotion that can serve judges well.
Expressions of sorrow, for example, may demonstrate respect
to present victims. A nice example from recent events: In a dis-
play remarkable enough to be extensively covered by the
media, a New York City trial judge presiding over the sentenc-
ing of a serial killer cried when pronouncing sentence.44 One
of the things that made this moment remarkable was that the
sentence made no practical difference; the defendant was
already serving multiple life terms in California. The judge’s
tears drove home its symbolic and emotional importance. The
victims’ families reported that those tears meant a lot to them:
they felt that their suffering had been acknowledged, turning a
proceeding that could have been painfully pro forma into one
that was meaningful. 
If the tears-at-sentencing example shows that judicial emo-
tion can convey compassion and respect, other emotions might
instill motivation. Much of the drug-court model, for example,
is premised on the idea that if the defendant feels that the judge
cares about his future, he will be motivated to change. That
defendant, we hope, will internalize some of the judge’s hopes
for him. Judges also report reciprocal benefits; feeling such
hope, at least from time to time, can make the more difficult
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moments far more bearable. 
The flip side of this coin, of
course, is the danger posed by
judicial emotion. Anger again
provides our primary example.
First, as suggested by the prior
discussion of moods, anger tends
to trigger shallow patterns of
thought, such as reliance on schemas and heuristics. Stereotypes
are a particularly pernicious sort of schema, raising the danger
that when a judge is angry she will be more prone to two-dimen-
sional judgment of litigants, lawyers, or witnesses.45 Of course,
we are most worried about negative stereotypes, like racial bias,
but positive stereotypes, like thinking police officers tend not to
lie, are equally worrisome. The point is that to the angry judge,
people may appear as types rather than as individuals. 
Another shallow thought pattern typical of the angry person
is quick endorsement of information that confirms the initial
anger appraisal. This means that the angry judge is likely to
give potentially important counter-evidence short shrift. Inter-
estingly, angry people tend also to be disproportionately per-
suaded by angry-sounding arguments, regardless of whether
those arguments are actually better.46
Next, anger can lead to decisions that are premature or
overly punitive—or both. The heightened sense of certainty it
brings can make a judge feel confident in the correctness of her
decisions very quickly. That tendency confers an obvious
advantage when further deliberation will be of no utility or
quick action is essential. Judges frequently confront those sit-
uations—for example, a witness may start to testify about
something off-limits and need to get shut down. But the ten-
dency is just as obviously disadvantageous where information-
gathering and reflection would disrupt an unwarranted
assumption or uncover a previously overlooked point. 
A case example illustrates this danger. In a complex civil case,
a district court judge was reversed for having dismissed the
plaintiffs’ case with prejudice as a sanction for discovery abuse.47
The lawyers’ conduct was legitimately infuriating: they played
games, provided misleading information, and evaded discovery
orders. But the judge’s anger eventually took the case down a
bad road. He appeared to become predisposed to interpret every
dispute in the way least favorable to the plaintiffs; possible lies
became clear ones; investigation increasingly seemed futile.
Things finally came to a head in a heated exchange in which a
lawyer addressed the court in a way best described as snarky, and
then suggested that the judge was factually mistaken about the
procedural history of the matter.  When the judge asked whether
the plaintiff had produced certain documents, the lawyer
retorted, “To them?,”  provoking this response:
THE COURT: Well, hell, yes.  Why would you ask a
question like that?  Hell, yes, to the defendant. . . . I kept
telling you to produce stuff. . . . You ducked. You wove.
You did everything to keep from producing them. . . .
Now what the hell do you not understand? You must
produce them. Jesus Christ, I don’t want any more duck-
ing and weaving from you on those 58 documents.
That’s unbelievable. That gives credence to everything I
just heard from the defense. Now, tell me why else you
don’t think that I ought to dismiss this case . . . You bet-
ter tell me. I’m about ready to throw this thing out.
When you tell me that you still haven’t produced those
goddamn 58 documents after four times, four times I’ve
ordered you to produce them. You are abusing this Court
in a bad way. Now tell me.
MR. STARRETT: Well, may I start with the fact—
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. STARRETT: —that you have not ruled four times
to give them those 58 documents—
THE COURT: That’s it. I’m done. I’m granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss this case for systematic
abuse of the discovery process. Mr. Harris [defense coun-
sel], I direct you to prepare a proposed order with every-
thing you’ve just put on that presentation. I’ll refine it
and slick it up. [Plaintiff’s witness] has abused this court,
has misled you, has lied on his deposition. It’s obvious
he’s lying about that e-mail. This case is gone. . . . What
a disgrace to the legal system. . . . We’re done. We are
done, done, done. What a disgrace. . . . We’re done.
In this exchange, the final straw was counsel’s effort to
explain that not all of the documents in question had been
ordered produced four times. Though tin-eared and poorly
timed, the assertion was basically true. But by that point, the
judge was simply “done.” And once he was “done,” he went
straight to the most punitive response, which left him open to
reversal. 
The point is not in any way to condemn the judge. Indeed,
the appellate court clearly had sympathy for his understand-
ably human reaction, and it probably is safe to say that every
judge could think of at least one situation in which she has
acted similarly. The point, rather, is to demonstrate how even
well-placed anger can create a decisional cascade which, if not
interrupted, may lead to error.
Third, judicial anger can bleed over into other situations.
Being angry at one person for one set of reasons increases the
odds of becoming angry at another person for another set of
reasons, whether that person deserves it or not. This reality
can lead to both misplaced and disproportionate blame. For
example, experimentally induced, utterly irrelevant anger has
been shown in mock-jury studies to correlate with more puni-
tive judgments of tort defendants, as well as with greater levels
of punishment.48
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Fourth, intense judicial anger can manifest in a grossly dis-
proportionate way that can feel literally involuntary. Stated col-
loquially, judges sometimes just lose it. A quick look at the
“benchslap” market—a popular feature on Above the Law—
makes this clear.49 Every major media outlet in the country
reported on a Fifth Circuit oral argument in which Chief Judge
Edith Jones slammed her hand on the bench and told a fellow
judge to “shut up.”50 Just as much media coverage descended
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court when one Justice was
accused of choking another during a testy exchange in cham-
bers.51 A top-trending video on YouTube (inelegantly but accu-
rately called “Flipping the Bird to the Judge”) showed a judge
at video arraignment coming down hard on a young defendant
who disrespected him (he later reversed the sanctions when
she apologized and explained she had been on drugs at the
time).52 Type “angry judge” into the YouTube search engine
and you will find an astonishing array of videos showing
judges screaming, throwing things, even pulling out guns.
From a judge’s perspective, one of the biggest downsides of los-
ing it is that suddenly you are the story.53
Finally, there is reason for judges to worry about the height-
ened sense of power that anger can engender. Because judges
have actual power over actual people, we might well worry
that anger could help a judge feel justified in acting like an
“absolute monarch,”54 or like “God in my courtroom.”55
If the previously described cluster of anger attributes is nec-
essary to judging, this cluster seems anathema to it. Other emo-
tions have evident downsides as well. Contempt, in particular,
presents clear dangers. Contempt is much like anger but with
one crucial difference. When we feel contempt for someone we
are judging them to be our inferior, not just hierarchically but
as a human being.56 For this reason it often is considered to be
a mixture of anger and disgust. Contempt would appear to
underlie the unfortunate insults judges sometimes lob at sen-
tencing, such as “animal,” “lowlife,” or “scumbag.”57 Because a
judge has no claim to superiority but only to authority, con-
tempt is likely unsuitable in nearly every instance.
And now we find ourselves
on the horns of a dilemma.
Judicial emotion giveth and it
taketh away. Anger, our recur-
rent example, is necessary to
critical aspects of judging, but
it simultaneously has tenden-
cies that can impair judging.
The same would appear likely
to hold true for most emo-
tions, though some will tend
generally to be more positive
(one nomination: compas-
sion) or negative (one nomi-
nation: contempt). We there-
fore are a juncture at which
judges need to call upon emotion regulation. 
JUDICIAL EMOTION REGULATION 
In the psychological literature, emotion regulation refers to
any attempt to influence what emotions we have, when we
have them, and how those emotions are experienced or
expressed. Regulation typically entails changing the emotion-
eliciting situation, changing your thoughts about that situa-
tion, or changing your responses to that situation.58
These are processes in which we all regularly engage,
including when at work. How we do so is heavily influenced
by professional norms: flight attendants and bill collectors, for
example, have to meet very different expectations as to how
they feel and display emotion.59 The ideal of dispassion sup-
plies the background professional norm for judges. When
judges report trying to act professionally, they are somehow
engaging in emotion regulation in an attempt to experience
and project neutrality. As the prior discussion revealed, not
only is this not always a good goal, it is an unrealistic one. It’s
particularly unrealistic to expect judges to pull off this feat
with precisely no guidance as to how. Justice Sotomayor stated
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with confidence that a good
judge simply puts her emotions
aside. Would that it were so easy.
The good news is that while
judicial emotion regulation may
not ever be easy, everyone can get
better at it, and its processes need
not remain a mystery. The first
step certainly is self-awareness, or
what Justice Sotomayor referred
to as recognizing your emotions.
The second step—about which we’ve displayed a remarkable
collective silence—is to engage appropriate emotion-regulation
techniques. Fortunately, that is something about which contem-
porary psychological research has a lot to say.
Such research shows that emotion regulation may be pur-
sued by way of a diverse array of strategies, each with distinct
costs and benefits. There is no such thing as a “good” or “bad”
strategy: all have both occasional utility and maladaptive man-
ifestations. However, some emotion regulation strategies tend
more toward particular types of costs and benefits, not to men-
tion paradoxical or unintended effects, and thus tend to be
more or less well suited to particular contexts. 
In the judging context, the ideal of dispassion has both
obscured that necessary level of analysis and pushed judges
toward strategies that tend to be maladaptive. Just because
generations of judges may have handled emotion in a particu-
lar way—by, say, ignoring it—doesn’t make the approach effec-
tive. Poor regulatory choices can be remarkably impervious to
correction through experience. 
The most critical regulatory capacities for a judge, therefore,
are sensitivity to her own experience, a deep bench of strategic
options, and context-driven flexibility in how those options are
employed. This combination allows her to exert far greater con-
trol over her emotions and how she chooses to express them.
Calling on the research literature illuminates which emotion-
regulation strategies are unlikely to be helpful, are most likely to
be harmful, and are most likely to be productive for judges. 
Unlikely to be helpful: avoidance. One very common regu-
lation strategy is avoidance. Avoidance comes in several differ-
ent flavors. You can simply avoid situations because of their
anticipated emotional effect; if that is not possible, you might
try to modify the situation to alter its emotional salience; and
if that is not possible, you might actively distract yourself.
Imagine that you have a contentious relationship with your
father-in-law, with whom you have to attend a big family din-
ner, and you know that talking with him always makes you
angry. You might arrange in advance to be seated far away from
him at dinner; if that is not socially acceptable, you might
arrange for someone you like to be seated on your other side
and engage that person in conversation whenever possible;
and if you do have to talk with your father-in-law, you might
pretend to listen while mentally going over your upcoming
week’s schedule. Such avoidance techniques are terrifically
helpful in regular life. If you avoid or significantly block out
the emotion trigger, you never have an emotion to deal with. 
Unfortunately, this strategy is very seldom appropriate for
judges. Judges’ ability to choose the emotional situations to
which they are exposed is extremely limited. Not only do you
not choose your cases, but often you can’t even choose your
court or the subject matter of your docket. This is, to be sure,
sometimes possible: a judge who finds family court intolerably
stressful might try to switch to a commercial docket, or a state-
court judge might seek appointment to the federal bench
because it will entail more variety and less exposure to violent
crime. But no matter the court or its jurisdictional parameters,
you can’t control who comes in the door, and you are guaran-
teed cases that will over time cover the emotional spectrum. A
judge can (and generally must) recuse herself from a specific
case if she has direct emotional involvement, such as a close
personal connection to a party. Otherwise, avoiding unwanted
emotion generally will not justify recusal unless it is so
extreme as to pose a serious threat to fundamental fairness.60
Nor can judges always modify situations in a meaningful
way. Again, it is possible on the margins. You can delegate talk-
ing with an irritating lawyer to a clerk, or call breaks, or limit
argument time, or otherwise tinker around with details to buy
some time and relief. These small tweaks can be enormously
helpful. The big emotion triggers, however, often can’t be
worked around. This is so for two primary reasons. 
First, part of the judge’s job is to orchestrate the exposure
that other people have to those triggers. If, for example, you
are deciding under the applicable rules of evidence whether to
withhold autopsy photos from the jury because you worry that
their emotional impact will outweigh informational value, you
need to look at them yourself. Indeed, you need to both have
and notice your own reaction, so it can serve as a rough barom-
eter to what could be expected from the jury. By helping other
people avoid triggers, you must face them yourself. Second, it
is often the most emotionally vivid aspects of a case that
demand your most careful attention. At criminal sentencing,
or when setting damages in tort and mass-disaster cases, you
must take close account of the precise harms caused. Even
with lower-impact emotional triggers, like a particularly inept
argument by a borderline-incompetent attorney, it is not pro-
fessionally acceptable to literally tune out (tempting though it
might be), as something important might happen. This relates
to another point raised elsewhere in this special issue: judicial
multi-tasking, which is one way of distracting yourself, has
consequences. Not surprisingly, distracted people demonstrate
impoverished recall of the situations from which they are dis-
tracting themselves—that’s the point, after all.61
Avoidance therefore is available to judges only in a marginal
way—ironically, because it works too well. It helps judges han-
dle emotional challenges only by helping them disengage from
what it is about the job that makes it emotionally challenging. 
Most likely to be harmful: experiential suppression and
denial. The strategy that is most obviously harmful for judges
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is to try to suppress emotion directly. Think of this as vowing
as a matter of willpower not to feel what you do not wish to,
or pretending—to yourself and others—that you are not feel-
ing it. A California state judge, for example, once described his
approach thus: “I’m not moved by emotion one way or the
other. I’m just kind of like an iceberg, but there is no heating.
I’m just here.”62
The first problem with this strategy is that it does not
achieve its intended purpose. (In the universe of problems,
that is a pretty big one to have.) Attempts to suppress emo-
tional experience or thoughts of an emotional event have not
been shown to have any meaningful effect on the emotions
themselves. In fact, suppression raises the danger of “ironic
rebound.”63 Think of a rough parallel to the “don’t-think-of-a-
pink-elephant” phenomenon, in which the more you try not to
think of something the more you think of it.64 Research shows
that we are somewhat better at suppressing emotions than
other sorts of thoughts, but that is a relative, not absolute,
facility. Emotional suppression can be followed by a counter-
productive increase in the frequency and intrusiveness of emo-
tional thoughts. Suppression also increases the physiological
concomitants of the undesired emotion, such as elevated heart
rate and sweating. It may give the illusion of calming the mind,
but it does not calm the body. 
These rebound and reactivity effects are especially pro-
nounced when a person is under conditions of stress and cog-
nitive load, which describes most moments in a judge’s work-
ing life. Adding denial to the mix tends to make matters worse,
because combining greater physical reactivity with conscious
disavowal of its source is dangerous. It creates a reaction in
search of a cause, meaning a person can easily latch onto an
unrelated, and sometimes innocent, target. The combination
has also been associated with impulsive decision making.65
Further, suppression and denial are highly effortful. Because
of the internal resources they consume, these strategies impair
memory, are associated with impaired performance on logical
tasks, and lead to overly simplistic judgments. 
Finally, these strategies take a toll on the judges who use
them. People who regularly suppress and deny emotion can
develop what psychologists call a “repressive coping style.”66
That style is characterized by (among other things) rigidity
and arrogance, two qualities we clearly would like to discour-
age. Indeed, those qualities have unique potential to erode the
public’s perception of the judiciary.67 People who habitually
repress emotion also are far less able to handle emotion when
they do experience it. One cau-
tionary tale may be found in a
Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion removing a trial judge
from the bench.68 He repeat-
edly treated litigants and
lawyers in a callous, rude, con-
descending, and abusive man-
ner. His own psychiatrist testi-
fied that a repressive anger-
management style had come to
define the judge’s personality,
such that he was in a constant
state of “emotional over-control” that left him unable to
“incorporate emotions into his life.” Instead, he displayed an
utter lack of empathy and periodically exploded. Finally, a
repressive coping style is associated with poor health out-
comes, such as anxiety, hypertension, and coronary heart dis-
ease.69
Caveats about the occasional utility of all regulatory strate-
gies notwithstanding, it is hard to say much good about emo-
tional suppression and denial. The best that can be said is that
a judge might sometimes have no choice but to use them in
extraordinary situations where the emotion threatens to over-
whelm the judge, there is no way to alter the situation, and a
temporary effort to completely ignore the reaction is the only
way to act in a professionally necessary manner. One can imag-
ine such situations. A judge who finds herself forced into that
position, though, will be much better off if she recognizes it for
what it is and gives herself time and space to cope with that
emotion after the crisis is over. 
Often necessary, but comes at a cost: behavioral suppres-
sion. Fortunately, emotion is not the only thing a judge can
suppress. Another common strategy is to suppress only its
external manifestation. Behavioral suppression involves inhibi-
tion of facial expressions (e.g., grimacing), verbalizations (e.g.,
groaning), or bodily movement (e.g., cringing). One masks the
true emotional state with an expression reflecting either neu-
trality (as with a “poker face”) or a desired one (as with a fake
smile). All judges likely spend a good deal of their time doing
exactly that—and for some very good reasons. However, behav-
ioral suppression takes a toll of its own.
The reasons why a person sometimes needs to hide emotion
are rather obvious, particularly to judges. Selectively displaying
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emotion can be highly strate-
gic. A judge might want to
keep an obnoxious attorney
from knowing he has gotten to
her, so as to discourage the
behavior by refusing the attor-
ney satisfaction. (Conversely,
the judge may believe that a
flash of anger might shut the
behavior down, in which case
she would opt for a controlled
display.) She may need to model calmness and decorum to oth-
ers, such as disruptive family members, which will make her
courtroom management duties easier. She may need to prevent
a jury from perceiving what she thinks of a witness, party, or
attorney so as not to influence the jury’s independent evalua-
tion. She may want to prevent other observers, including the
public, from being able to guess what she thinks, lest it improp-
erly broadcast an outcome. The good news is that inhibiting the
outward signs of emotion is relatively effective, particularly if
you are well practiced in doing so. Judges often can keep oth-
ers from perceiving what they feel.
Unfortunately, behavioral suppression is not very effective
as an internal matter. It, too, is effortful, so it has some nega-
tive effects. Behavioral suppression impairs memory for infor-
mation presented during the suppression period. Other cogni-
tive capacities, like logical reasoning, also suffer.70 Those
effects may not be as pronounced as with suppression and
denial, but they remain significant; indeed, they are equivalent
to those attending avoidance. As stated bluntly to this author
by a prominent scholar, behavioral suppression makes a per-
son temporarily “stupider.” 
Further, keeping an emotion from showing does not keep a
person from feeling it. Again, the profile is less extreme than
with experiential suppression. Controlling your facial and bod-
ily movements generally will blunt, but not eliminate, positive
emotions. Interestingly, it has no such effect for negative ones.
That is, suppressing a smile can make you a bit less happy, but
suppressing a frown is not likely to make you less angry. Judges
tend to be most concerned about displaying emotions such as
sorrow, contempt, disgust, and anger, but it is not at all clear
that behavioral suppression will have any effect on this cluster
of feelings. Finally, suppressing expression does not lessen
emotion’s physiological concomitants, and it may in fact
increase them.
Judges can take some comfort that behavioral suppression is
usually going to work in terms of how you are perceived. How-
ever, it is important to be aware that controlling outward signs
of emotion comes at a cost and is not doing any work in terms
of dealing with the emotion itself.
Most likely to be helpful: cognitive reappraisal and disclo-
sure. Thus far the analysis has looked to one strategy (avoid-
ance) that is seldom available; one (suppression and denial)
that is counterproductive, even dangerous; and one (behav-
ioral suppression) that is often necessary but generally costly
and ineffective. Fortunately, two other strategies have a more
positive profile. If the judge can neither avoid, alter, nor ignore
an emotional situation, she may change how she thinks about
it. She also can choose to enlist the perspectives of others by
selectively disclosing her experiences. This final section takes
up these approaches in turn.
Cognitive reappraisal. Recall that an “appraisal” refers to the
thought structure that underlies any given emotion. A “reap-
praisal” therefore refers to a change in those thoughts, which
then leads naturally to a different emotional response. If, for
example, a person comes to believe that a harm was inflicted
accidentally rather than deliberately or negligently, she has no
more reason to be angry and may instead be simply sad. 
The first way in which judges can leverage the power of
reappraisal is by examining the reasons behind their emotions,
so as to determine whether they represent a correct and appro-
priate response. The judge in the viral YouTube video, for
example, may have reacted much less angrily had he consid-
ered the high probability that the defendant was under the
influence of drugs. Her behavior would have been equally
offensive to decorum, but would not have represented a per-
sonal insult. In contrast, it may be entirely appropriate to be
angry at a defendant who uses sentencing as a forum to insult
and taunt his victims.71 Reasons matter. Self-aware judges can
learn to do quick gut-and-brain checks not only on what they
are feeling, but on why they feel it.
While reappraisal may be engaged in real time, a good deal
of thought realignment can happen during times of reflection.
Consider trying the following exercise. Think about situations
in which people you encounter at work—lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, and colleagues—have made you mad. Any given
judge’s anger triggers will, upon introspection, break into rela-
tively stable categories, such as lying, cheating, abusing others,
disrespect, sloppiness, and so on. Then think about why those
particular things make you angry. Finally, think about whether
those reasons justify anger, taking care to examine why or why
not. In a light-hearted but revealing article reflecting just such
an exercise, a Los Angeles state-court trial judge identified reli-
able triggers for his anger, including “lack of civility,” tardi-
ness, cell phones going off in court, “attorney incompetence,”
and the “herding cats” work of trying to get everyone in the
courtroom at the same time.72 He concluded that he would be
much happier if he let some of those go—for example, by
reminding himself that he is sometimes late, decent people
sometimes forget to turn off their cell phones, and so forth. 
Attorney incompetence, in contrast, is legitimately anger-
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ing. This is an important conclusion to reach, too, but not
because it changes the underlying emotion. Rather, deliber-
ately accepting the underlying thoughts puts the judge at just
enough distance to evaluate her possible responses, and to
choose the most fitting one. The judge in Los Angeles learned
to choose different patterns of response to unprepared or
unskilled attorneys—typically by being direct, courteous, and
brief—by focusing on what was within his power to change.
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski describes engaging in a similar
mental exercise after a prosecutor lied to him about a matter of
consequence. After reflection, he concluded that anger was
precisely the right response, and he therefore chose to name
the prosecutor in a harsh written opinion so as to maximize
the deterrent message.73
The second cognitive appraisal technique that holds great
promise for judges is committing to look at situations through
a professional “lens.” This is best explained with an analogy to
being a doctor. Like judges, doctors regularly encounter stim-
uli that naturally provoke strong emotions, like festering
wounds. An important part of learning to be a doctor is learn-
ing to regard that festering wound as professionally relevant.74
It represents a source of information about what is wrong with
the patient and an opportunity to display professional compe-
tence. The doctor thus learns to regard it without disgust, not
by suppressing disgust but by thinking about the wound in a
way that fails to satisfy the appraisal structure of disgust. 
Judges have their own festering wounds to confront. Some-
times that is literally true—recall the example of the autopsy
photos—but more often it is figuratively true. Courtrooms can
be a theater for much that is broken and disturbing in our
world and how we treat one another. For many judges, the
most effective way of approaching that reality will be, when
possible, to treat vivid stimuli as professionally relevant rather
than personally provocative. Such a precommitment helps the
judge stay focused on specific goals—for example, discerning
the informational value of that autopsy photo, since she is the
only one empowered to make that judgment call. That profes-
sional lens can dissipate the emotional salience of the stimuli.
Judges would likely report that when this works, it works
well. The experimental literature shows that even laypeople
can deliberately call on such a neutral-observer approach—
tellingly, by pretending briefly to be doctors—with good
results. When asked to look at disturbing images as a doctor
would, and to think about them “objectively and analytically
rather than as personally, or
in any way emotionally rele-
vant,” they feel less emotion;
show less emotion; display
enhanced, not diminished,
memory; and show
decreased physiological
reactivity.75
Of course, labs are labs.
What an experimental sub-
ject can pull off for a short
period of time, in a con-
trolled environment, with an anticipated stimulus and
explicit instructions, is instructive. To be pulled off by real
judges in real situations, this species of reappraisal must be
trained and practiced. 
Reappraisal, in sum, is of enormous value to judges because
it asks them to think differently, instead of simply command-
ing them to feel differently.
Disclosure. As the above discussion reveals, some amount of
emotion is inevitable, no matter how skilled a judge is at reg-
ulation. Some situations cannot be avoided; behavioral sup-
pression leaves emotions largely intact. Even cognitive
appraisal has limits, for not every situation can be rethought.
Sometimes the elderly person really did lose her entire life sav-
ings to a fraud, or that parent really did brutally rape his child,
or the defendant really does spit in your face.76 Nor would one
want to rethink every situation. The warm glow that comes
from helping families heal, for example, should be savored for
what it is. And the professional lens sometimes will simply
crack. No judge has truly seen everything, and everyone will
be thrown from time to time, just as doctors are. The only way
to prevent such moments is to become closed off and jaded—
to grow that “rhino skin” feared by the Australian magistrate. 
One highly effective strategy for coping with and learning
from those inevitable emotions is disclosure. Disclosure, also
known in the literature as “social sharing,” is the act of think-
ing and talking about your emotions and the experiences that
triggered them.77 To be productive, it must be selective: a judge
should not, for example, indulge in highly public expressions
of vitriol against a colleague.78 But when done thoughtfully
and with a prosocial motive, judicial disclosure of emotion can
be invaluable.
This is not because social sharing eventually dissipates the
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emotion, as if you were empty-
ing a bag. To the contrary, it
tends to reawaken the emo-
tion, often quite vividly. Chief
Judge Kozinski, for example,
recounted to this author a
story more than four decades
old of his son nearly being run
over, and he reported feeling as
terrified, guilty, and shaken as
if it had happened yesterday. Paradoxically, though, disclosure
is a basic impulse that people overwhelmingly experience as a
net positive. Why? 
First, disclosure enhances self-knowledge. By talking or
writing about emotional experiences, we help create a detailed
internal data bank of those experiences. That data bank allows
us to judge our reactions more coherently and consistently.
This sense of heightened self-knowledge and control can help
us live with emotion more comfortably, for we come to experi-
ence those emotions as an integrated aspect of the self. 
Second, disclosure enlists insight and support from others.
This is particularly true when we share emotional challenges
with people who face similar circumstances. Imagine the exer-
cise proposed earlier, in which you identified persistent anger
triggers. Now imagine showing your list to another judge. That
judge would be well-positioned to help with any necessary
reappraisal by explaining whether and how she believes you
are off base, overreacting, or right on the mark. Your spouse,
friends, and other close confidants can serve a similar func-
tion. Perhaps most importantly, communicating with others
helps us feel understood and supported. Numerous judges
have reported to this author that they wish they could have
this sort of communication with their colleagues but feel ner-
vous about doing so, largely because of stigma. The more
judges were to act on that impulse to disclose, the less stigma-
tized it would become.
Finally, public disclosure of judicial emotion also can be
productive (and would go a long way toward dissolving the
stigma). When the public sees the human underneath the robe,
it has a better understanding of how a judge is doing her job.
Disclosing emotion makes transparent an otherwise hidden
input to judicial decision making and invites evaluation
thereof. As the tears-at-sentencing example showed, the reac-
tion can be quite positive, even enhancing respect for the judi-
ciary. A rather different sort of public disclosure would be to
write about it in an opinion, article, or book. For example,
Chief Judge Kozinski wrote a law review article about a crimi-
nal sentencing that unexpectedly triggered those feelings he
had when he inadvertently placed his son in danger, prompt-
ing him to show the defendant mercy. Once on the table, the
propriety of such a motivation was open for debate.79
Disclosure thus can help judges feel more comfortable with
their emotions, and helps ensure that those emotions influence
decision making in a deliberate, thoughtful, and transparent
way. 
CONCLUSION
Within law, we have inherited some hefty cultural baggage,
weighted down with the belief that a good judge is emotion-
less. This article has unpacked that baggage and suggested that
it is that belief, not emotion, that should be put aside. We need
a new ideal: that of the emotionally intelligent judge. The emo-
tionally intelligent judge is self-aware and is able to think
coherently about her emotions and to be in control of their
expression. She is willing to seek the opinions and support of
others and approaches the emotional challenges of the job with
openness and flexibility.
In attempting to thus shift our ideal, we are not alone. More
than a decade ago pioneers in medical education came to real-
ize that, by acculturating doctors to a similar ideal of dispas-
sion, they inadvertently were training them to suppress and
deny emotion, with bad results. Medical students lost empathy
for patients with each year of training; many showed perfor-
mance-impairing levels of emotional disengagement.80 These
pioneers now are seeking to train medical professionals to
improve their emotion-regulation skills. So far, all results are
positive: among the important findings is that clinical perfor-
mance improves as measures of emotional intelligence rise.81
Even with these advances, the general pattern unfortunately
persists. Describing her recent studies of the impact of emotion
on Canadian oncologists, a health psychologist has empha-
sized the importance to doctors of acknowledging their feel-
ings, especially grief:
Not only do doctors experience grief, but the profes-
sional taboo on the emotion also has negative conse-
quences for the doctors themselves, as well as for the
quality of care they provide. Our study indicated that
grief in the medical context is considered shameful and
unprofessional. Even though participants wrestled with
feelings of grief, they hid them from others because
showing emotion was considered a sign of weakness. . . .
The impact of all this unacknowledged grief was exactly
what we don’t want our doctors to experience: inatten-
tiveness, impatience, irritability, emotional exhaustion
and burnout. . . . Even more distressing, half our partici-
pants reported that their discomfort with their grief over
patient loss could affect their treatment decisions with
subsequent patients. Oncologists are not trained to deal
with their own grief, and they need to be.82
If we were to replace the words “oncologists” and “doctors”
with “judges,” I daresay most judges would nod in recognition.
Whether in medicine or law, cultural baggage this heavy is not
easily shed.
Fortunately, the psychology of emotion has done much of
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the heavy lifting already. There is much we still need to learn
about judicial emotion, but we know more than enough to get
started. Judges can learn to prepare realistically for, and
respond thoughtfully to, the emotions they are bound to feel.
It’s time we integrated those lessons into how we train and sup-
port our judiciary. 
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Afamous tale talks about three baseball umpires whowere asked how they rule on a ball. One said, “I call itlike I see it.” Another said, “I call it like it is.” And the
last one (and this is attributed to umpire Bill Klem) said, “It
ain’t nothin’ till I call it.” While the first umpire admitted he
was an imperfect human observer, the second and third
umpires claimed they were infallible and judged cases only
based on their objective merits. So, what can be said about
court judges? Are court judges such impartial rulers that they
can “call it like it is”? Or, as the first umpire humbly confessed,
are they limited human observers confined by the boundaries
of human cognition? 
In this article, we briefly review some of the accumulating
evidence suggesting that in some cases judges could be prone
to cognitive fallacies and biases that might affect their judicial
decisions. We review several studies on cognitive biases relat-
ing to elements of the hearing process (considering evidence
and information), ruling, or sentencing. These findings sug-
gest that irrelevant factors that should not affect judgment
might cause systemic and predictable biases in judges’ deci-
sion-making processes in a way that could be explained using
known cognitive heuristics and biases. 
Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts, or rules of thumb, by
which people generate judgments and make decisions without
having to consider all the relevant information, relying instead
on a limited set of cues that aid their decision making.1 Such
heuristics arise due to the fact that we have limited cognitive
and motivational recourses and that we need to use them effi-
ciently to reach everyday decisions. Although such heuristics
are generally adaptive and contribute to our daily life, the
reliance on a limited part of the relevant information some-
times results in systemic and predictable biases that lead to
sub-optimal decisions. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman
(who later won an economics Nobel Prize for his joint work
with the late Tversky) introduced the heuristics-and-biases
approach by first identifying key heuristics and the biases they
sometimes cause. For example, the availability heuristic is the
one by which we judge the probability of an event based on
how easy it is to recall instances of such an event. Try to think,
for example, of words that start with the letter “r” compared to
words that have “r” as the third letter. Although the latter is
more frequent in English, people think there are more words
that start with “r” simply because they are easier to recall.2
The use of the availability heuristic, as with other cognitive
and judgmental heuristics, is one of the System 1 processes of
thinking.3 System 1 processes are those in which thinking, judg-
ment, and choice are more intuitive, experiential, and adaptive.
They are faster and consume fewer cognitive resources. This
contrasts the System 2 processes, which are more analytic, rely-
ing on facts and normative rules and requiring many more cog-
nitive resources—which are often not available in everyday situ-
ations.4 Although heuristics are highly adaptive and sometimes
offer “good-enough” solutions to a problem, they also lead to
judgmental biases, fallacies, and illusions that hamper people’s
judgments, choices, and decision making. 
Various heuristics and biases have been identified and
described in research literature.5 In this article, we review evi-
dence on the use of heuristics and biases among court judges
(as well as other professional law experts) that affect judgment
and the decision-making process in the courtroom. Before we
begin, we would like to note two related topics that are not
addressed in this article. The first concerns the vast literature
about social biases, such as racial bias or gender bias, that are
sometimes found in trials. Although this is a very important
issue, much has already been said (and done) about it, and it
is, as the reader will notice, very different from the cognitive
biases we describe here. Second, much research has focused on
biases among jurors’ decisions making. Although we some-
times mention jurors in the following pages, we decided to
generally exclude such research from the current review
because we would like to focus on how professional judges
(and sometimes lawyers) might be prone to cognitive biases,
despite their experience and expertise. In the next sections, we
review evidence for cognitive and judgmental biases that per-
tain to the hearing process, the ruling process, and the sen-
tencing process.  
BIASES IN THE HEARING PROCESS
During a trial, judges are presented with evidence; they may
ask for additional or other evidence, they may judge evidence as
inadmissible, or they may decide to give more (or less) weight
to certain pieces of evidence. Such tasks in the hearing process
might be affected by several cognitive biases including the con-
firmation bias, the hindsight bias, or the conjunction fallacy. 
Confirmation Bias
If people have a preconception or hypothesis about a given
issue, they tend to favor information that corresponds with
their prior beliefs and disregard evidence pointing to the con-
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trary. This confirmation bias makes people search, code, and
interpret information in a manner consistent with their
assumptions, leading them to biased judgments and deci-
sions.6 For example, in a classic study at Stanford University,
participants who were either for or against capital punishment
read about studies that either supported or challenged capital
punishment. It was shown that participants favored studies
that followed their prior attitudes: those who were in favor of
capital punishment agreed more with studies that confirmed
their position and rated those studies as better and more con-
vincing, while those who were against capital punishment
favored the studies that argued against it.7
Confirmation bias can also affect judges when they hear and
evaluate evidence brought before them in court. Specifically,
judges might be biased in favor of evidence that confirms their
prior hypotheses and might disregard evidence that does not
correspond with their previous assumptions. Indeed, several
studies have pointed to the occurrence of this bias among
judges, lawyers, or police officers. For example, Rassin and his
colleagues presented these groups of experts with a murder
case in which the victim was a female psychiatrist and the
prime suspect was the wife of one of her patients.8 The wife
was accused of killing the psychiatrist, allegedly out of jeal-
ousy. Participants were asked to review 20 pieces of informa-
tion and to rate the degree these incriminated or exonerated
the prime suspect. However, half of the participants were also
told about the possibility of another suspect: a former male
patient of the psychiatrist who had been harassing her for a
long time. Surprisingly, all participants rated the pieces of evi-
dence similarly and all thought the prime suspect was guilty in
the same degree. Thus, it seems that the judges, lawyers, and
police officers failed to consider the alternative scenario. Evi-
dence was considered only if it helped them confirm their
prior belief of the prime suspect’s guilt and was disregarded if
it pointed to a different suspect. 
Hindsight Bias
When people evaluate events or outcomes after they have
occurred, they sometimes exhibit a hindsight bias when they
judge the event as being more predictable then it was before it
actually happened. This “we knew it all along” phenomenon
has been shown to occur in many areas such as history, medi-
cine, finance, and the law, among others.9 In the basic experi-
ment, participants are given a set of possible outcomes and are
told which one of them is true. Then they are asked to assess
the probability of each outcome.
Although different participants are
told that different outcomes are
true, all assign higher probabilities
to the outcome told to be true, no
matter what it is.10 In general, the
hindsight bias refers to the
inequality between foresight and
hindsight: although events are less
predictable before than after they
actually happened, people cannot ignore information about
whether an event has happened or not, and they assign it a
higher probability in the former case.
Hindsight bias has been shown to occur in the courtroom as
well, mainly in liability cases.11 In such cases, the task of the
judges or jurors is to assess how foreseeable an outcome was
and to evaluate whether the plaintiff’s behavior took this risk
into consideration. The problem is that judges evaluate the
outcome in hindsight, while the plaintiff only had the chance
to provide foresight about it. For example, in one case a physi-
cian was accused of malpractice because he failed to detect a
tiny tumor in an early chest radiography. The tumor got bigger
and the patient died as a result, leading to the malpractice
claim. The physician was found guilty after another radiolo-
gist—who saw the radiographs after the tumor was found—
testified that the tumor could have been detected in the early
radiography.12 Clearly, the second radiologist had the benefit of
knowing the tumor was actually there, an advantage the first
physician did not have at the time. In addition, studies have
found that the severity of the outcome increases hindsight bias
dramatically. For example, judges who were informed that a
psychiatric patient became violent were more likely to find the
patient’s therapist negligent than those who did not receive
information about the outcome and its severity.13
Conjunction Fallacy
Another type of judgmental bias relates to how people judge
the probability of events based on the detail in which these
events are described. In particular, it has been found that more
detailed descriptions of an event can give rise to higher judged
probabilities.14 This bias has been termed the conjunction fal-
lacy because it shows that people erroneously believe that
events described in more detail are more probable than those
that are described in less detail. According to classic probabil-
ity theory, less detailed events actually contain various
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instances of more detailed events
and thus cannot be less probable
than any of the contained events.
For example, just as the probabil-
ity of an object being a fruit can-
not be smaller than the probabil-
ity it is an apple, the probability
of a suspect being convicted of a
crime cannot be smaller than the
probability that he will be con-
victed of a specific crime, such as
burglary.
However, one study showed
that expert attorneys actually
committed this conjunction fal-
lacy when asked to evaluate the chances of a specific case
(Jones vs. Clinton) being disposed by a judicial verdict as
opposed to an outcome other than a judicial verdict.15 When
attorneys were asked to evaluate the probabilities of different
types of outcomes that were not judicial verdicts (such as set-
tlements, dismissals, withdrawals, etc.), they assigned much
higher probabilities to each of these outcomes—sometimes
totaling even higher than 1— than they did to the general
probability of the case being disposed by an outcome that was
“not a judicial verdict.”16 Although no studies have examined
this conjunction fallacy among judges, research on other biases
among judges (such as the research reviewed in this article)
leads us to predict that judges might be prone to this bias as
well. 
BIASES IN THE RULING PROCESS
The biases described in the previous section related to the
hearing process, but they also involved effects on the outcome
of a trial and the judge’s ruling process. In the next section we
review more examples of different biases that affect judges’ rul-
ing processes. These include the inability to ignore inadmissi-
ble evidence and biases in decisions of sequential ruling. 
Inability to Ignore Inadmissible Evidence
Sometimes evidence that is presented in trial can be deemed
as inadmissible because it was obtained illegally, is considered
hearsay, is highly prejudicial, or is problematic for some other
reason. When inadmissible evidence is wrongfully presented in
jury trials, judges may instruct juries to disregard or ignore the
evidence. However, many studies have shown that a jury’s abil-
ity to not consider inadmissible evidence is questionable at
best. For example, Doob and Kirshenbaum showed that mock
jurors were more likely to rate a defendant as guilty when they
were exposed to prior criminal-record information than when
no record information was given, even when judicial instruc-
tions were that prior record information should be used only
to determine credibility rather than as an indicator of guilt.17
Other studies showed similar findings, as jurors’ decisions
seemed unaffected by instructions to disregard or ignore inad-
missible evidence.18
That jurors—who are inexperienced laymen—cannot
ignore inadmissible evidence is not as surprising as is the fact
that some judges could not do so either. As one study showed,
experienced judges were not different from inexperienced
jurors in reacting to inadmissible evidence.19 In this study,
both groups read about a product-liability case including (or
not including) biasing material and were either instructed (or
not) to disregard this piece of inadmissible evidence. Both
jurors’ and judges’ verdicts depended heavily on whether the
biasing material was included, but these decisions were not
altered if that evidence was deemed as inadmissible. Thus, it
seems that judges, as with jurors, cannot easily disregard inad-
missible evidence, although they know they should.
Biased Decisions in Sequential Ruling
When judges make repeated sequential rulings, they tend to
rule more in favor of the status quo over time, but they can
overcome this tendency by taking a food break.20 In their
study, Danziger and his colleagues examined 1,112 judicial
rulings by 8 Israeli judges, made over 50 days in a 10-month
period, all regarding parole requests.21 The study showed that
about 65% of the rulings were in favor of the plaintiff at the
beginning of each session (in the morning, after breakfast
break, and after lunch break), and they gradually decreased to
0-10% at the end of each session. The authors concluded that
the repeated rulings depleted the judges’ mental resources,
causing judges to have a higher likelihood of granting parole in
the first cases after a break.22 However, additional analyses
showed that some overlooked factors—such as the non-ran-
dom ordering of cases (cases with representation sometimes go
first), and the fact that the parole board tries to complete cases
from one prison before taking a meal break—could have
accounted for some of the observed downward trend.23
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BIASES IN THE SENTENCING PROCESS
The next and final group of biases we review here relate to the
process of sentencing, or assigning punishment to the convicted
party. First, we review a comprehensive study that modeled sen-
tencing decision making by comparing normative to heuristic
models. Second, we discuss a prevalent bias in sentencing that
stems from the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic. 
Modeling Sentencing Decisions
In the beginning of the article, we asked whether judges are
rational decision makers who contemplate every relevant aspect
in the optimal manner or whether they are sometimes satisfied
with using simpler heuristics. One study that tried to answer
this question regarding sentencing decisions examined several
possible normative and heuristic cognitive models in trying to
evaluate which model better described judicial decisions and
the magnitude of sentences in trials on theft, forgery, and fraud
in a German court.24 The results showed that with respect to
relatively minor offenses, prosecutors and judges considered
only a limited number of factors while neglecting other legally
relevant and highly important ones. The discrepancies between
the number of factors that should have been considered and the
number of those actually considered, according to the decision
analysis, were higher when the offense characteristics were less
serious; for more serious offenses, the discrepancies found were
smaller. Examining both judges and prosecutors in the context
of sentencing is important due to the high frequency of plea
bargaining, at least in U.S. courts.25 For example, although
judges and prosecutors indicate that they base their sentencing
and sentencing requests on the relevant and important factors
of the presence of a confession or a prior record, the analysis
revealed that these factors were neglected. Other relevant and
legally important factors indeed affected the sentencing, while
possible factors that should not affect sentencing (e.g., race, sex,
nationality) were found not to have affected it. Von Helversen
and Rieskamp indicated that the neglected factors could be
explained by cognitive constraints but also by time limitations
under which sentencing decisions were made.26
Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Anchoring-and-adjustment refers to the process of assimila-
tion of a numeric estimate toward a previously considered
standard. In their classic anchoring study, Tversky and Kahne-
man asked participants comparative and absolute consecutive
questions about the percentage of African nations in the
United Nations.27 In the com-
parative question, participants
indicated whether the percent-
age of African nations in the
U.N. was higher or lower than
an arbitrary number (the
anchor): either 65 or 10 (the
alleged result of spinning a
roulette wheel). Then, participants were asked an absolute
question regarding their best estimate of the actual percentage.
Absolute judgments were assimilated to the provided anchor
value, so the mean estimate of African nations in the U.N.
among participants who received the high anchor was 45%,
compared to 25% for participants receiving the low anchor.
Since Tversky and Kahneman’s classic study, the effect of
anchoring-and-adjustment has been demonstrated in various
domains of judgment and decision making and was proven to be
a strong, robust, reliable, and persistent psychological effect.28
Several theoretical explanations have been offered for the mech-
anism through which the anchor affects the numerical estima-
tion or prediction. Some scholars believe that people integrate
the anchor to the answer and adjust from it insufficiently,29
adjusting estimates until an acceptable value is found; however,
the adjustment is usually insufficient because it arrives at the
nearest upper or lower boundary of a large range of acceptable
values.30 There is also the selective-accessibility model, in which
comparing a target to an anchor leads to a biased search strategy
consistent with positive-hypothesis testing: when presented
with a low anchor, people will retrieve information consistent
with the hypothesis that the estimate is small, and vice versa.31
As can be expected, judges have also been found to be
affected by anchors in their judicial decisions. As criminal-sen-
tencing decisions pertain to numeric quantities, they are also
affected by numeric anchors, whether they are minimal sen-
tences that the law presents or sentences demanded or recom-
mended by prosecutors,32 attorneys, or probation officers.33 For
example, anchoring affected both novice and experienced
judges when they were presented with two different demands
for sentence by an alleged prosecutor on a hypothetical rape
case—12 months or 34 months.34 Anchoring affected the ruling
sentence even when the judges declared that the anchor was
not relevant to their decision. Enough and Mussweiler sug-
gested that the anchor affected the ruling of the judges because
of selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent
knowledge: given an anchor of a relatively severe punishment
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(34 months in the above study), the judges retrieved more
information that was consistent with this sentence—that is, evi-
dence and details that were consistent with more severe pun-
ishment.35 In contrast, given the more lenient punishment (12
months in the study), the judges retrieved more information
that was consistent with this sentence—that is, evidence and
details that were consistent with less severe punishment. As a
result, the rulings of the judges were affected by the given
anchor, whether it was more relevant and informative or less so. 
In a follow-up study, Englich and others showed a similar
anchoring effect even when the anchor was set not by the pros-
ecutor (a potentially relevant source), but rather by a journal-
ist (who is an irrelevant source, as the media should not affect
judicial decisions).36 The study compared the effect of anchor-
ing on judges who were experts in criminal law versus others
who were not, to find similar effects for the two groups.37
These findings are consistent with those of Northcraft and
Neale, as well as Mussweiler and others, who found that the
judgments of experts are also susceptible to the effect of
anchoring.38
CONCLUSION
In this article, we summarized research that demonstrated
how heuristic thinking is involved in judicial decision making.
Although heuristic thinking is typically efficient, it may cause
biases at times.39 Heuristic thinking was demonstrated in vari-
ous contexts of the hearing process, the ruling process, and the
sentencing process. The hearing process may be affected by
hindsight bias, confirmation bias, or the conjunction fallacy.
Heuristic thinking also characterizes some of the ruling
process that might be biased, since judges are unable to ignore
inadmissible evidence and since they make biased decisions in
sequential rulings. Heuristic thinking might also affect the sen-
tencing process, due to a tendency to rely on a limited number
of factors and because of the dominant effect of anchoring.
Thus, research suggests that judges, prosecutors, and other
professionals in the legal field use heuristic thinking in judicial
processes and decisions, although not all of them may be aware
of such use. 
A question that arises is, “What can be done to counteract
judicial bias?” To answer this question, one must first deter-
mine the origin of the bias. The method of overcoming bias
depends on whether the cause of bias lies in the task, the
judge, or a combination of the two. If we assume a judge is the
culprit, we may employ techniques that aim at improving the
judge’s ability to circumvent the bias. Fischhoff identified sev-
eral such techniques, including warning people in advance
about the existence of bias, describing the likely direction of a
bias, illustrating biases to the judges, and providing extended
training, feedback, coaching, and other interventions.40 He
concluded that the first three strategies yielded limited success
and that even intensive, personalized feedback and training
produced only moderate improvements in decision making.41
Although some experiments have shown that some biases,
such as the hindsight bias, could be counteracted, research is
still needed to explore whether it is possible to counteract
other biases among judges, such as the ones described in this
article, and to what degree.42 Obviously, awareness to the
heuristic thinking and the resulting possible biases affecting
judicial decisions is a prerequisite for any future attempt to
limit these biases. We hope that this article will be a small step
towards that goal. 
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NEW ETHICS OPINIONS
Judge’s Use of Electronic
Social Networking Media
ABA Formal Opinion 462
http://goo.gl/qipo8
Can a judge be a Facebook friend with
an attorney who appears before the judge?
That question has resulted in conflicting
ethics opinions. The Florida Judicial
Ethics Committee concluded that a lawyer
should not be a Facebook friend of a judge
because the public identification of a
lawyer as a “friend” of the judge “conveys
the impression that the lawyer is in a posi-
tion to influence the judge.” Florida Advi-
sory Op. 2009-20 (http://goo.gl/22Zkd).
Similarly, a California ethics committee
concluded that a judge may not have a
social-networking relationship with an
attorney while that attorney has a case
pending before the judge. Calif. Judges
Ass’n Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 66
(2010) (http://goo.gl/ytuUh). But other
state ethics opinions have not been so
restrictive:
• A New York advisory committee noted
that a judge “generally may socialize in
person with attorneys who appear in
the judge’s court,” so using technology
to do so shouldn’t create an ethics vio-
lation for the judge. Even so, the com-
mittee cautioned that the public nature
of these online friendships might cre-
ate the appearance of a particularly
strong bond and thus require recusal.
N.Y. Advisory Op. 08-176 (2009)
(http://goo.gl/RPBkE). 
• A Kentucky advisory committee urged
judges to be “extremely cautious” and
noted that several judges who had ini-
tially joined social-networking sites
had since limited or ended their partic-
ipation. But the committee concluded
that a judge could ethically be a Face-
book friend with persons who
appeared in court, including attorneys,
social workers, and law-enforcement
personnel. Ky. Advisory Op. JE-119
(2010) (http://goo.gl/wgC49).
• A South Carolina advisory committee
concluded that a judge could be a
Facebook friend with law-enforcement
officers so long as they didn’t discuss
anything related to the judge’s position
in the online communications. S.C.
Advisory Op. 17-2009 (2009)
(http://goo.gl/KjMf3).
The American Bar Association has now
waded into this thicket with a formal
ethics opinion on the judicial use of social-
networking media, including Facebook.
The ABA’s conclusion—judges may partic-
ipate in the social-networking world, just
as they can have in-person relationships,
but ethics rules still must be considered.
The ABA opinion provides a roadmap
to the judicial-ethics rules (as found in
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct) that should guide a judge in the
social-networking world:
• Rule 1.2 provides that a judge “shall
avoid . . . the appearance of impropri-
ety” and “shall act at all times in a
manner that promotes public confi-
dence in the independence, integrity,
and impartiality of the judiciary.”
Based on this rule, the ABA opinion
cautions “that the judge be sensitive to
the appearance of relationships with
others,” including online relation-
ships. As the opinion notes, electronic
messages, images, and information—
once created—may be electronically
transmitted without the judge’s per-
mission to unintended recipients. 
• Rule 2.4(C) provides that “[a] judge
shall not convey or permit others to
convey the impression that any person
or organization is in a position to influ-
ence the judge.” The ABA opinion cau-
tions judges not to “form relation-
ships” online that may convey such an
impression. 
• Rule 2.9 prohibits ex parte communi-
cations about pending or impending
matters except as otherwise authorized
by law. Rule 2.10 prohibits a judge
from making “any public statement
that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome or impair the fair-
ness of a matter pending or impending
in any court.” And Rule 3.10 provides
that a judge “shall not practice law”
and may not give legal advice except to
members of the judge’s immediate fam-
ily. The ABA opinion concludes that
“[a] judge should avoid comment
about a pending or impending matter
in any court,” should “avoid using any
[electronic social-media] site to obtain
information regarding a matter before
the judge,” and should “take care not
to offer legal advice” while on social-
media sites.
• Rule 2.11 provides that a judge “shall
disqualify himself or herself in any
proceeding in which the judge’s impar-
tiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned,” including where the judge
“has a personal bias or prejudice con-
cerning . . . a party’s lawyer.” The rule
also provides that a judge subject to
disqualification “other than for bias or
prejudice” against a party or lawyer
“may disclose on the record the basis
of the judge’s disqualification and may
ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, outside the presence of the
judge and court personnel, whether to
waive the disqualification.” The ABA
opinion concludes that “whenever
matters before the court involve per-
sons the judge knows or has a connec-
tion with professionally or personally,”
the judge “should disclose on the
record information the judge believes
the parties or their lawyers might rea-
sonably consider relevant to a possible
motion for disqualification even if the
judge believes there is no basis for dis-
qualification.” As an example, the
opinion suggests that “a judge may
decide to disclose that the judge and a
party, a party’s lawyer or a witness have
an [electronic social-media] connec-
tion, but that the judge believes the
connection has not resulted in a rela-
tionship requiring disqualification.”
For judges in states in which no ethics
opinions have yet been rendered on judi-
cial use of electronic social media, the
ABA opinion provides an excellent start-
ing point for analysis. A cautious judge
might also want to review the Florida and
California opinions.
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